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1 
Mine and Thine Distinct: What Kelo Says 
About Our Path 
Timothy Sandefur* 
Susette Kelo’s pink Victorian house in the quaint Connecti-
cut town of New London seemed a strange place to find the Hob-
besian “war of all against all.”  She purchased the house in 1997, 
and renovated it “from the concrete in the basement to the shin-
gles on the roof,” into a pleasant, two-bedroom, one-bathroom, 
waterfront home.1  Still, when city officials notified her that the 
city wanted to bulldoze it and replace it with a convention center 
to accompany the nearby Pfizer pharmaceutical plant, Mrs. Kelo 
began a case that would touch on some of the most important is-
sues in the political philosophy of the American Constitution.  In 
the end, the United States Supreme Court held, five to four, that 
the city could take her home and transfer it to a private devel-
oper for private profit,2 despite the fact that the Fifth Amend-
ment only allows government to take property “for public use.”3  
The general economic effects of private development, wrote Jus-
tice Stevens, satisfied the “public use” requirement, because 
“public use” only means that political leaders believed the con-
demnation might benefit the public in some way: “The disposition 
of this case therefore turns on the question whether the City’s 
development plan serves a ‘public purpose.’”4  Since “[p]romoting 
economic development is a traditional and long accepted function 
of government,” the city’s redevelopment plan was constitutional, 
 
 * Staff Attorney, Pacific Legal Foundation.  J.D. 2002, Chapman University School 
of Law; B.A. 1998, Hillsdale College.  Mr. Sandefur is the author of CORNERSTONE OF 
LIBERTY: PROPERTY RIGHTS IN 21ST-CENTURY AMERICA (2006).  In Kelo v. City of New 
London, he represented several victims of eminent domain (the Bugryn Family, the 
Pappas family, and Mr. Curtis Blanc), as well as economists James Buchanan and Gordon 
Tullock, as amici curiae.  He also filed an amicus curiae brief on behalf of the Pacific Le-
gal Foundation and the ACLU Fund of Michigan in Wayne County v. Hathcock, and has 
worked on several other cases involving the abuse of eminent domain.  Thanks to Dana 
Berliner and Edward Erler for their helpful comments. 
 1 Kirstin Downey, Revitalization Projects Hinge on Eminent-Domain Lawsuit, 
WASHINGTON POST, May 21, 2005, at E01; see also Dana Berliner, Eminent Domain With-
out Limits?  IJ Asks U.S. Supreme Court to Decide, INSTITUTE FOR JUSTICE, Aug. 2004, 
http://www.ij.org/publications/liberty/2004/13_4_04_d.html; Patti Waldmeir, Case for The 
Public Good Collides with Private Rights, FINANCIAL TIMES (U.K.), Feb. 14, 2005, at 20.  
 2 Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2668 (2005). 
 3 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 4 Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2663. 
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and Susette Kelo and her neighbors could be forced to give up 
their property to another private party for private development.5 
Kelo v. New London is the result of a crisis in American po-
litical philosophy—but not a new one.  Consider the contrast be-
tween the views of private property expressed by two Supreme 
Court decisions separated by a century and a half.  In 1829, the 
Supreme Court said:  
We know of no case, in which a legislative act to transfer the property 
of A. to B. without his consent, has ever been held a constitutional ex-
ercise of legislative power in any state in the union.  On the contrary, 
it has been constantly resisted as inconsistent with just principles, by 
every judicial tribunal in which it has been attempted to be enforced.6 
But in 1978, Justice William Brennan held that the Fifth 
Amendment does not require compensation when a person’s 
property rights are taken for “some public program adjusting the 
benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common 
good.”7  Because “[g]overnment hardly could go on” if government 
were required to pay for all the property it takes from citizens, 
“in a wide variety of contexts . . . government may execute laws 
or programs that adversely affect recognized economic values”8 
without repaying the owners. 
The journey from Justice Story to Justice Brennan, and from 
there to Justice Stevens’ decision in Kelo, was not an inevitable 
one.  As Justice Clarence Thomas pointed out in his dissent in 
Kelo, “[s]omething has gone seriously awry with this Court’s in-
terpretation of the Constitution.”9  In what follows, I hope to ex-
plain how we have reached this point, and why I think there is 
reason for optimism in spite of the Kelo decision. 
In Part I, I examine the evolution of concepts of sovereignty 
in Anglo-American law and political philosophy.  Eminent do-
main is an attribute of sovereignty, and attitudes toward the 
scope and source of sovereignty are therefore essential to under-
standing the purpose and limits of eminent domain.  In Part II, I 
describe the rise of two distinct visions of American sovereignty 
in the age leading up to the Progressive Revolution that occurred 
at the opening of the twentieth century.  I follow in Part III with 
a discussion of how the Progressives came to embrace the vision 
of sovereignty advanced by William Blackstone and Thomas 
Hobbes, to the exclusion of the Lockean understanding of sover-
eignty that had served as the foundation of the Constitution.  
 
 5 Id. at 2665. 
 6 Wilkinson v. Leland, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 627, 658 (1829). 
 7 Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124–25 (1978). 
 8 Id. at 124 (quoting Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922)). 
 9 Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2685 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
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Part IV follows the consequent expansion of eminent domain 
through the New Deal period, and Part V concludes with some 
optimistic thoughts about the future of eminent domain in the 
wake of the Kelo decision. 
I. EMINENT DOMAIN AS AN ATTRIBUTE OF SOVEREIGNTY 
Eminent domain is the government’s power to force a person 
to sell his property to the government.  Long described as one of 
the most extreme forms of government coercion, the term itself 
dates back to the seventeenth century, when Hugo Grotius and 
other civil law writers explained that it was an essential aspect 
of the king’s sovereign authority.10  Legal scholar Samuel von 
Pufendorf explained that it was simply a part of the sovereign’s 
right to conscript the resources of the realm for defensive pur-
poses.11  This authority was considered an essential component of 
sovereignty—that is, of the right to govern.  Of course, debates in 
political philosophy have always centered around the nature and 
limits of this right. 
During the period leading up to the twentieth century, An-
glo-American political and legal theory developed two competing 
visions of sovereignty.  One view, traceable to the works of Tho-
mas Hobbes and William Blackstone, held that political authority 
was essentially absolute, not limited by any pre-political stan-
dards of right and wrong.12  The other view, traceable to the work 
of John Locke, and including such thinkers as James Madison, 
held that government authority was based on the rightful, and 
therefore limited, consent of the governed, and thus the state 
could never legitimately exceed the boundaries of individual 
rights.13  The clash between these two theories set the stage for 
the Progressive Revolution and, ultimately, the controversy over 
eminent domain that would be enunciated in the Kelo decision 
 
 10 HUGO GROTIUS, THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE 388 (A.C. Campbell trans., Ada-
mant Media Corp. 2005) (1625). 
 11 SAMUEL VON PUFENDORF, ON THE DUTY OF MAN AND CITIZEN ACCORDING TO 
NATURAL LAW 166–67 (James Tully ed., Michael Silverthorne trans., Cambridge Univ. 
Press 1991) (1673) (“[I]n a national emergency sovereigns may seize and apply to public 
use the property of any subject which the crisis particularly requires, even if the property 
seized far exceeds [the subject’s taxes].  For this reason, however, as much of the excess as 
possible should be refunded to him from the public treasury or by a levy on the rest of the 
citizens.”)  The Tennessee Constitution, among others, reflects the connection between the 
power of eminent domain and the power of military conscription: “[N]o man’s particular 
services shall be demanded, or property taken, or applied to public use, without the con-
sent of his representatives, or without just compensation being made therefor.”  TENN. 
CONST. art. I, § 21. 
 12  WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES *156–57; THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 
134–141 (Michael Oakeshott ed., Macmillan Publ’g Co. 1962) (1651). 
 13 JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 375 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge 
Univ. Press 1963) (1690). 
01-48 SANDEFUR.DOC 12/26/2006 10:46:42 AM 
4 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 10:1 
and its dissents. 
A. Hobbes on Sovereignty 
In his famous book Leviathan, written in 1651, the philoso-
pher Thomas Hobbes sought to explain the nature and source of 
political authority by imagining what the world would look like 
without government—something he called the state of nature.  In 
such a world, Hobbes argued, people would be engaged in a con-
stant war for limited resources.  In the absence of an overseeing 
government authority, there would be “no propriety, no domin-
ion, no mine and thine distinct; but only that [would] be every 
man’s, that he can get: and for so long, as he can keep it.”14  The 
strong would prey upon the weak, and would, in turn, be preyed 
upon by still stronger individuals.  But, perhaps surprisingly, 
Hobbes concluded that such a state of affairs would not be unjust.  
Without government to police the activities of the people, there 
would be no rules of justice by which such plunder and pillage 
could be described as wrong, because without politics, “nothing 
can be unjust. . . . Where there is no common power, there is no 
law: where no law, no injustice.”15  Before government comes 
along, might literally makes right. 
Life in such a world would be so miserable, of course—
“solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short”16—that the people cre-
ate government to protect themselves.  But because the people 
are not subject to pre-political interpersonal rules of conduct, 
they are not limited in the sorts of governments they may estab-
lish.  When creating government, the people give the sovereign 
all of their freedoms; but in the desperate scramble for survival 
in the state of nature, “every man has a right to everything; even 
to one another’s body.”17  This power they grant to the govern-
ment, meaning that the sovereign has, essentially, the same 
“right to everything.”  For Hobbes, political society is “radically 
conventional”18: because the sovereign’s acts are the very defini-
tion of justice, it is meaningless to argue that the sovereign may 
act unjustly.19 
 
 14 HOBBES, supra note 12, at 101. 
 15 Id. 
 16 Id. at 100. 
 17 Id. at 103. 
 18 Lawrence Berns, Thomas Hobbes, in HISTORY OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 396, 400 
(Leo Strauss & Joseph Cropsey eds., Univ. of Chicago Press 1987) (1963). 
 19 See id. at 407 (“The sovereign is not bound to obey the civil laws, for they are only 
his commands and he can release himself from them at his pleasure.”) 
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2006] Mine And Thine Distinct 5 
B. Locke on Sovereignty 
John Locke’s influential Two Treatises of Civil Government 
built upon—and simultaneously rejected important parts of—
Hobbes’ theory.  Locke agreed that, in the absence of govern-
ment, the people would be exposed to plunder and injury by the 
strong, and that government was essentially an institution for 
preventing such plunder.  But Locke differed from Hobbes on an 
important point.  For Locke, “[t]he State of Nature has a Law of 
Nature to govern it,” and “Reason . . . is that law.”20  This law 
“teaches . . .  that being all equal and independent, no one ought 
to harm another in his Life, Health, Liberty, or Possessions.”21  
This law was binding on people even in the absence of political 
authority.  And since the law prohibits people from stealing from 
each other, or harming one another, it also prohibits the people 
from delegating to the government the power to commit such 
acts, “[f]or no Body can transfer to another more power than he 
has in himself; and no Body has an absolute Arbitrary Power 
over . . . any other, to . . . take away the Life or Property of an-
other.”22  Instead, people create government to protect them from 
the wrongful acts of others.  Unfortunately, just as criminals will 
steal and plunder in the state of nature, so clever wrongdoers 
will find ways to gain control over the government and use its co-
ercive powers to continue committing wrongful acts.  When gov-
ernment joins in such acts, it has exceeded its legitimate bounds 
and is engaged in tyranny.  Locke’s insight—that government 
must obey the same moral rules that apply to the individuals 
who comprise it—means that government’s authority is limited 
by the pre-political rights of individuals. 
C. Blackstone on Sovereignty 
In his Commentaries on the Laws of England, William 
Blackstone explicitly rejected the theory of limited political au-
thority advanced by “Mr Locke, and other theoretical writers.”23  
Instead, he defined sovereignty as “uncontrolable authority in 
making, confirming, enlarging, restraining, abrogating, repeal-
ing, reviving, and expounding of laws, concerning matters of all 
possible denominations, ecclesiastical, or temporal, civil, mili-
tary, maritime, or criminal”;24 it is “absolute despotic power”;25 “a 
 
 20 LOCKE, supra note 13, at 289. 
 21 Id. 
 22 Id. at 375.  See also ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA 6 (1974) 
(“Moral philosophy sets the background for, and boundaries of, political philosophy.  What 
persons may and may not do to one another limits what they may do through the appara-
tus of a state, or do to establish such an apparatus.”) 
 23 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 12, at *157. 
 24 Id. at *156. 
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supreme, irresistible, absolute, uncontrolled authority”26 which 
“can, in short, do every thing that is not naturally impossible.”27 
Blackstone may not have endorsed Hobbes’ theory in so 
many words, but his description of sovereignty has much in 
common with Hobbes’.  Although he grudgingly respected Locke’s 
contention that there are pre-political rules of right and wrong, 
he nevertheless rejected the notion that sovereignty is limited by 
any such rules.28  “So long . . . as the English constitution lasts,” 
Blackstone concluded, “we may venture to affirm, that the power 
of parliament is absolute and without control.”29 
D. The American Founders on Sovereignty 
In this respect at least, the American founding represented a 
rejection of Blackstone’s views.30  Relying on Locke, the Founders 
argued that the natural moral law forbade the creation of any 
government that committed theft, or any similar violation of 
natural rights.31  In Jefferson’s words, “the people in 
mass. . . . are inherently independent of all but moral law.”32  
Even the Declaration of Independence itself holds that the united 
colonies may only “do . . . things which independent states may of 
right do”33—not absolutely anything, but only those political acts 
that fell within the boundaries of natural moral law.  The Ameri-
can founding recognized no such thing as absolute sovereignty in 
the Blackstonian sense.  As Madison wrote:  
[T]he sovereignty of the society as vested in & exercisable by the ma-
jority, may do anything that could be rightfully done by the unani-
mous concurrence of the members; the reserved rights of individu-
als . . . in becoming parties to the original compact being beyond the 
legitimate reach of sovereignty, whenever vested or however viewed.34   
 
 25 Id. 
 26 Id. at *49. 
 27 Id. at *156. 
 28 See Herbert J. Storing, William Blackstone, in HISTORY OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 
622, 626 (Leo Strauss & Joseph Cropsey eds., Univ. of Chicago Press 1987) (1963) (de-
scribing the broad power inherent in Parliament and its theoretical, but impracticable, 
limitations). 
 29 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 12, at *157. 
 30 Thomas Jefferson and James Wilson both explicitly rejected Blackstone’s work 
because of its emphasis on “the existence of despotic government.”  Julian S. Waterman, 
Thomas Jefferson and Blackstone’s Commentaries, 27 ILL. L. REV. 629, 649–52 (1933). 
 31 See HARRY V. JAFFA, A NEW BIRTH OF FREEDOM 50–51 (2000).  Obviously, the ter-
rible exception to this was slavery.  It was an exception, however, which the framers rec-
ognized.  THOMAS G. WEST, VINDICATING THE FOUNDERS 1–19, 39 (1997). 
 32 THOMAS JEFFERSON, Letter to Judge Spencer Roane (Sept. 6, 1819), in WRITINGS 
1425, 1426 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1984) (1819) (emphasis added).   
 33 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 32 (U.S. 1776) (emphasis added). 
 34 9 JAMES MADISON, Sovereignty (1835), reprinted in THE WRITINGS OF JAMES 
MADISON 568, 570–71 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1910). 
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The concept of individual rights therefore served to chain politi-
cal powers within the same moral law that applied to individu-
als.35 
In a brilliant essay entitled “Property,” James Madison made 
the Founders’ position on property rights clear.  Beginning with a 
quotation from Blackstone, Madison wrote that the word prop-
erty “in its particular application means ‘that dominion which 
one man claims and exercises over the external things of the 
world, in exclusion of every other individual.’”36  But “[i]n its lar-
ger and juster meaning, it embraces every thing to which a man 
may attach a value and have a right; and which leaves to every 
one else the like advantage.”37  For Madison, Blackstone’s defini-
tion of property was not “just” enough because it did not recog-
nize that the legitimate sovereignty of a government was limited 
by each person’s right to the control of his own life.  A “juster” 
definition of property, therefore, would include a person’s rights 
over “his opinions,” and “the safety and liberty of his person.”  
Government “is instituted to protect property of every sort; as 
well that which lies in the various rights of individuals, as that 
which the term particularly expresses.  This being the end of gov-
ernment, that alone is a just government, which impartially se-
cures to every man, whatever is his own.”38  Madison’s differ-
ences with Blackstone rested on fundamentals; while Blackstone 
wrote eloquently about the English government’s protections for 
property rights,39 his view of the foundation of government’s au-
thority—that the government could violate the natural rights of 
individuals—rendered property fundamentally insecure.  Indeed, 
the property that people had in their religious opinions, among 
other things, had been notoriously insecure under the English 
monarch.  Americans had thrown off that monarchy because it 
had often perverted the entire concept of government into just 
 
 35 THOMAS JEFFERSON, Letter to James Madison (Sept. 6, 1789), in WRITINGS, supra 
note 32, at 959, 960 (“What is true of every member of the society individually, is true of 
them all collectively, since the rights of the whole can be no more than the sum of the 
rights of individuals.”)  For the foundations of the Lockean understanding of property 
rights, see Eric R. Claeys, Public-Use Limitations And Natural Property Rights, 2004 
MICH. ST. L. REV. 877 (2004); Adam Mossoff, What Is Property?  Putting The Pieces Back 
Together, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 371 (2003); Adam Mossoff, Locke’s Labor Lost, 9 U. CHI. L. SCH. 
ROUNDTABLE 155 (2002).  The founders, to put it simply, did not believe, as many mod-
erns do, that property rights are created by the state, or that the state can legitimately 
alter its property rights rules in a way that deprives people of their property.   
 36 JAMES MADISON, Property (1792), reprinted in WRITINGS 515, 515 (Jack N. Rakove 
ed., 1999).  It seems Madison was quoting from memory; the actual text states property is 
“that sole and despotic dominion which one man claims and exercises over the external 
things of the world, in total exclusion of the right of any other individual in the universe.”  
2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 12, at *2. 
 37 Id. 
 38 Id. 
 39 See 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 12, at *135–36. 
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another unjust scheme for allowing the strong to despoil the 
weak.  Thus, Madison ultimately rejects Blackstone’s view of 
sovereignty as inconsistent with Blackstone’s own definition of 
property rights. 
In an edition of Blackstone’s Commentaries published in 
1803, Virginian lawyer St. George Tucker added an appendix and 
several passages directly challenging Blackstone’s characteriza-
tion of sovereignty, along Madisonian lines.  The Blackstonian 
view of sovereignty must be altered, Tucker wrote, in accordance 
with “the new lights which the American revolution has spread 
over the science of politics.”40   
[T]he American revolution has formed a new epoch in the history of 
civil institutions, by reducing to practice, what, before, had been sup-
posed to exist only in the visionary speculations of theoretical writ-
ers. . . .  [The Constitutions of a] number of the states in the union, 
and . . . that instrument, by which the union of the confederated states 
has since been completed, . . . the powers of the several branches of 
government are defined, and the excess of them, as well in the legisla-
ture, as in the other branches, finds limits, which cannot be trans-
gressed without offending against that greater power from whom all 
authority, among us, is derived; to wit, the PEOPLE.41 
Tucker distinguished between the sovereignty of the people 
and the powers of the legislature; the “essential difference be-
tween the British government and the American constitutions,” 
he wrote, quoting Madison, is that while “parliament is unlimited 
in it’s [sic] power, or, in their own language, is omnipotent,” 
American legislatures are  
altogether different.  The people, not the government, possess the ab-
solute sovereignty.  The legislature, no less than the executive, is un-
der limitations of power. . . . [T]he great and essential rights of the 
people, are secured against legislative, as well as against executive 
ambition.  They are secured, not by laws paramount to prerogative; 
but by constitutions paramount to laws.42 
Despite this rejection of Blackstone’s theory of an inherent 
“despotic power,” many American lawyers came to admire Black-
stone, particularly because of his excellent writing style.  Thomas 
Jefferson fretted about this in one of his final letters: “You will 
recollect that before the revolution, Coke Littleton was the uni-
versal elementary book of law students . . . .”  He wrote to Madi-
 
 40 1 ST. GEORGE TUCKER, BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES: WITH NOTES OF 
REFERENCE, TO THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS, OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE 
UNITED STATES; AND OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA app. A at 3 (1803). 
 41 Id. at 4. 
 42 2 TUCKER, supra note 40, app. G at 19–20.  Tucker is quoting from Madison’s Re-
port on the Alien and Sedition Acts, also known as his Report on the Virginia Resolutions 
(Jan. 7, 1800), reprinted in WRITINGS, supra note 36, at 608, 645. 
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son: 
You remember also that our lawyers were then all whigs.  But when 
his black-letter text, and uncouth but cunning learning got out of fash-
ion, and the honied Mansfieldism of Blackstone became the student’s 
hornbook, from that moment, that profession (the nursery of our Con-
gress) began to slide into toryism, and nearly all the young brood of 
lawyers now are of that hue.43   
As Blackstone’s popularity grew, the concept of unlimited sover-
eignty became increasingly common in legal circles, to the dis-
may of several of the founders.44 
II. TAKING FROM A AND GIVING TO B 
Two distinct legal “parties,” if one might call them that, 
emerged during the nineteenth century.  One, following Locke’s 
theories of natural law, held that government’s powers were lim-
ited by its nature, even if a state’s constitution did not explicitly 
limit legislative authority.  This view rested on what Randy Bar-
nett has recently called the “presumption of liberty,”45 which held 
that the government could only do those things specifically al-
lowed to it; in Madison’s words, “[i]n Europe, charters of liberty 
have been granted by power.  America has set the example . . . of 
charters of power granted by liberty.”46  The other view, following 
Blackstone, held that sovereignty was unlimited, except for 
whatever express limits could be found in the state’s constitution.  
Under this “presumption of power,” the legislature could do 
whatever was not forbidden. 
This profound debate found its first eloquent expression in 
the dispute between Justices Samuel Chase and James Iredell in 
Calder v. Bull,47 a 1798 Supreme Court case arising from a dis-
pute over a will.  The probate court had ruled the will invalid, so 
that Caleb Bull could recover; the Connecticut legislature then 
passed a new law granting a new hearing, to which the litigants 
had not previously been entitled, and the court reversed itself.  
Calder challenged this law, on the ground that it was an ex post 
facto law, and the Supreme Court rejected the challenge, holding 
 
 43  THOMAS JEFFERSON, Letter to James Madison (Feb. 17, 1826), in WRITINGS, su-
pra note 32, at 1512, 1513–14. 
 44 See Waterman, supra note 30, at 649–52.  In particular, Blackstone’s view that 
absolute sovereignty was primary and the rights of the people secondary was popular 
among defenders of slavery.  WILLIAM W. FREEHLING, PRELUDE TO CIVIL WAR: THE 
NULLIFICATION CONTROVERSY IN SOUTH CAROLINA 160–62, 171 (1966). 
 45 RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF 
LIBERTY (2004). 
 46 JAMES MADISON, Charters (Jan. 19, 1792), reprinted in WRITINGS, supra note 36, 
at 502, 502. 
 47 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798). 
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that the ex post facto clause only applied to criminal laws.  In the 
course of the decision, Justice Chase rejected the notion of “the 
omnipotence of a State Legislature, or that it is absolute and 
without control.”48  Embracing the Lockean position, Chase in-
sisted that there were unwritten, but valid limitations on the 
sovereignty of the state: 
The people of the United States erected their Constitutions, or forms 
of government, to establish justice, to promote the general welfare, to 
secure the blessings of liberty; and to protect their persons and prop-
erty from violence.  The purposes for which men enter into society will 
determine the nature and terms of the social compact; and as they are 
the foundation of the legislative power, they will decide what are the 
proper objects of it: The nature, and ends of legislative power will 
limit the exercise of it. . . . There are certain vital principles in our free 
Republican governments, which will determine and over-rule an ap-
parent and flagrant abuse of legislative power; as to authorize mani-
fest injustice by positive law; or to take away that security for per-
sonal liberty, or private property, for the protection whereof the 
government was established.  An ACT of the Legislature (for I cannot 
call it a law) contrary to the great first principles of the social com-
pact; cannot be considered a rightful exercise of legislative author-
ity. . . . A few instances will suffice to explain what I mean.  A law 
that punished a citizen for an innocent action . . . a law that makes a 
man a Judge in his own cause; or a law that takes property from A. 
and gives it to B: It is against all reason and justice, for a people to en-
trust a Legislature with SUCH powers; and, therefore, it cannot be 
presumed that they have done it. . . . To maintain that our Federal, or 
State, Legislature possesses such powers, if they had not been ex-
pressly restrained; would, in my opinion, be a political heresy, alto-
gether inadmissible in our free republican governments.49 
Chase was following the Lockean tradition that government 
must never be taken over by a faction that exploits the state’s co-
ercive powers for their own private benefit; doing so would vio-
late the natural rights of the victims, and transform government 
from a protective association into a mechanism for legalized rob-
bery. 
Justice Iredell strongly disagreed.  Iredell rejected the argu-
ments of “some speculative jurists” who contended “that a legis-
lative act against natural justice must, in itself, be void.”50  Em-
bracing the Blackstonian presumption of power, he wrote that if 
a government “were established, by a Constitution, which im-
posed no limits on the legislative power, the consequence would 
inevitably be, that whatever the legislative power chose to enact, 
 
 48 Id. at 387–91. 
 49 Id. at 388–89 (emphasis omitted) (emphasis added). 
 50 Id. at 398 (Iredell, J., concurring). 
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would be lawfully enacted, and the judicial power could never in-
terpose to pronounce it void.”51  Citing Blackstone’s Commentar-
ies, Iredell argued that a court would have no authority to inter-
vene even if the legislature created a law that allowed a person to 
be the judge in his own case—the very definition of injustice—
unless there were specific constitutional language prohibiting 
it.52  If a state were to “pass a law, within the general scope of 
their constitutional power, the Court cannot pronounce it to be 
void, merely because it is, in their judgment, contrary to the 
principles of natural justice.”53 
The fact that the majority in Kelo quoted from Justice Ire-
dell’s decision,54 while the dissents both quoted from Justice 
Chase’s,55 demonstrates the degree to which this debate has 
served as one of the most fundamental—if not the most funda-
mental—controversy in the history of American constitutional 
law.56 
For those who followed Chase’s Lockean interpretation, gov-
ernment action taking property from A and giving it to B was the 
quintessential abuse of government.57  Government existed to 
protect the natural rights of each person equally, and particu-
larly the right of property.  Without government, property own-
ers would be at risk from bullies who might try to take their 
property; government was supposed to prevent this.  But if a 
group of unusually clever thieves managed to gain control of gov-
ernment’s coercive power, they might use it to commit theft any-
way.  This is what Madison meant when he wrote, “[i]n a society 
under the forms of which the stronger faction can readily unite 
and oppress the weaker, anarchy may as truly be said to reign as 
in a state of nature, where the weaker individual is not secured 
against the violence of the stronger . . . .”58  Thus Chase, like 
Madison, was drawing a distinction between law and acts of mere 
force.  Law meant government—acting with the consent of the 
governed—using coercion in the service of the public good; while 
mere force meant government coercion in the service of the pri-
vate benefit of the governing authority.  To the latter, the people 
could not justly consent at all. 
 
 51 Id. 
 52 Id. at 398–99. 
 53 Id. at 399. 
 54 See Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2667 n.19 (2005). 
 55 See id. at 2671 (O’Connor, J., dissenting); id. at 2680 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 56 See generally Timothy Sandefur, Freedom and the Burden of Proof, 10 INDEP. REV. 
139 (2005). 
 57 See, e.g., Vanhorne’s Lessee v. Dorrance, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 304, at 311, 28 F. Cas. 
1012 (C.C.D. Pa. 1795); Wilkinson v. Leland, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 627, 658 (1829). 
 58 The FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 324 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
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Those who followed Blackstone, on the other hand, though 
they often recognized that such abuses were regrettable, denied 
that they were inherently illegitimate, or that the judiciary had 
any authority to do anything about them.  And some positively 
defended the practice of government redistribution of wealth. 
Two nineteenth-century cases, decided within a few years of 
each other, reveal the importance of this dichotomy, and its effect 
on private property rights.59  In Sharpless v. Mayor of Philadel-
phia,60 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruled that the city could 
spend tax dollars to buy bonds in a privately-run railroad.  This 
scheme was challenged on the grounds that it essentially took 
from A—the non-consenting taxpayers—and gave to B—the pri-
vate owners of the for-profit railroad.  Taking the Blackstonian 
position, the Sharpless court explained that there were no theo-
retical limits on the power of the legislature: “In the beginning,” 
wrote Chief Justice Jeremiah Black,61  
the people held in their own hands all the power of an absolute gov-
ernment.  The transcendant [sic] powers of Parliament devolved on 
them by the revolution.  Antecedent to the adoption of the federal con-
stitution, the power of the states was supreme and unlimited.  If the 
people of Pennsylvania had given all the authority which they them-
selves possessed, to a single person, they would have created a despot-
ism as absolute in its control over life, liberty, and property, as that of 
the Russian autocrat.62   
The people had chosen, for prudential reasons, to put certain lim-
its in the state constitution, but where those limits did not explic-
itly apply, the people’s elected representatives were still free to 
employ this “despotism” as they chose.  The state constitution 
should be construed “liberal[ly] in favor of the government,” so 
that “the state may do whatever is not prohibited.”63  Thus, while 
the legislature could not violate the federal Constitution, or the 
express provisions of the state Constitution, it was “entitled to 
the full and uncontrolled possession” of a “vast field of power, 
granted to the legislature by the general words of the constitu-
tion, and not reserved, prohibited, or given away to others.”  The 
legislature’s use of this general, undefined power “can be limited 
 
 59 In addition to the two cases discussed, see Wynehamer v. People, 13 N.Y. 378, 
390–92 (1856), which addresses, but does not decide, this conflict. 
 60 21 Pa. 147 (1853). 
 61 Black went on to serve as Attorney General and Secretary of State for President 
Buchanan, a position where he served as an unembarrassed defender of slavery.  Black 
later drafted President Johnson’s message vetoing the Reconstruction Act.  Susan Col-
man, Black, Jeremiah Sullivan, in 1 GREAT AMERICAN LAWYERS: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA 58, 
58–62 (John R. Vile ed., 2001).  
 62 Sharpless, 21 Pa. at 160 (citations omitted). 
 63 Id. 
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only by their own discretion.”64  After quoting Justice Iredell’s 
opinion in Calder, and asserting that “[t]o aid, encourage, and 
stimulate commerce . . . is a duty of the sovereign, as plain and 
as universally recognised as any other,”65 Black upheld the gov-
ernment’s authority to support a private, for-profit enterprise by 
taxation.  Moreover, the court indicated that private corporations 
doing a “public duty” could be vested with the power of eminent 
domain.66 
By contrast, only four years later, the California Supreme 
Court embraced the Lockean view in Billings v. Hall.67  That case 
struck down the “Settler’s Act,” a law which required any absen-
tee landholder who wished to evict a squatter to pay the squatter 
the value of any improvements on the land.  If the owner refused 
to pay, he would forfeit his land to the squatter.  “It has been er-
roneously supposed, by many,” wrote Justice Hugh C. Murray,68 
that the Legislature of a State might do any act, except what was ex-
pressly prohibited by the Constitution. . . .  Some [i.e., followers of 
Blackstone] contend that the very existence of government depends 
upon the supreme power being lodged in some branch of the govern-
ment, from which there is no appeal, and, if laws are passed which are 
immoral, or violate the principles of natural justice, the subject is 
bound to obey them.  Others [i.e., followers of Locke] contend that 
there are boundaries set to the exercise of the supreme sovereign 
power of the State, that it is limited in its exercise by the great and 
fundamental principles of the social compact, which is founded in con-
sent, express or implied; that it shall be called into existence for the 
great ends which that compact was designed to secure, and, hence, it 
cannot be converted into such an unlimited power, as to defeat the end 
which mankind had in view, when they entered into the social com-
pact.69 
After quoting Locke’s explanation of the natural limits on 
sovereignty, Murray concluded—somewhat optimistically—that 
“[w]hatever doubt may have formerly existed on this subject, the 
question has been settled, by an overwhelming weight of author-
ity, in this country, that the spirit of free institutions is at war 
with such a principle” as legislative supremacy.70  Since the Con-
stitution gave government no “power to take the property of A 
 
 64 Id. at 161. 
 65 Id. at 170. 
 66 Id.  
 67 7 Cal. 1 (1857); see also Timothy Sandefur, A Natural Rights Perspective on Emi-
nent Domain in California: A Rationale for Meaningful Judicial Scrutiny of “Public Use,” 
32 SW. U. L. REV. 569 (2003) (discussing the history of California’s public use clause at 
length) [hereinafter Sandefur, Natural Rights Perspective]. 
 68 Billings, 7 Cal. at 10.  Chief Justice Murray is today remembered for his shocking 
racist opinion in People v. Hall, 4 Cal. 399 (1854).   
 69 Billings, 7 Cal. at 10. 
 70 Id. at 13. 
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and give it to B,”71 the legislature could not transfer land from a 
landowner to a squatter in this way.  “It is a law as immutable as 
those of nature, that States and nations, like individuals, are 
bound to obey the principles of natural justice in all their deal-
ings with their subjects and others . . . .”72 
This debate continued to the beginning of the twentieth cen-
tury.  Less than twenty years after Billings, the California Su-
preme Court reversed itself in a passionate opinion called Stock-
ton & Visalia Railroad v. Common Council of Stockton.73  Like 
Sharpless, the Stockton & Visalia Railroad case challenged gov-
ernment’s authority to invest taxpayer money in a private rail-
road.  Progressive Chief Justice William T. Wallace relied on 
Sharpless when he declared that the legislature “is politically 
omnipotent, except in those particulars in which its power has 
been limited, qualified, or absolutely withdrawn by the provi-
sions of the Federal or the State Constitution.”74  But no such ab-
solute limitation existed in the Constitution with regard to 
spending tax money to support a private business.  True, the 
Constitution prohibited the taking of property except for public 
use, but “[n]o constitutional definition of the words ‘public use’ 
is . . . given in that instrument,”75 and the Constitution left its 
definition to the legislature, not the courts.  “The resolve of a leg-
islative body, by which . . . private property taken, is, therefore, 
necessarily a legislative determination, that a public use is to be 
promoted . . . and such a determination is the determination of a 
merely political question by the political department of the Gov-
ernment.”76 
Only three years later, however, the United States Supreme 
Court would hold that for government to finance a private, for-
profit railroad through tax dollars was unconstitutional.  In Loan 
Association v. Topeka,77 the Court held that taxation was sup-
posed to serve the public welfare, not the private welfare.  If gov-
ernment’s coercive power were to be used for private benefit, it 
would be force, not law, and would violate the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s requirement of “due process of law.”  There are cer-
tain private rights “in every free government beyond the control 
of the State,” explained Justice Samuel Miller.78 
  The theory of our governments, State and National, is opposed to 
 
 71 Id. at 13–14. 
 72 Id. at 15. 
 73 41 Cal. 147 (1871). 
 74 Id. at 161. 
 75 Id. at 168. 
 76 Id. 
 77 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 655 (1874). 
 78 Id. at 662. 
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the deposit of unlimited power anywhere. . . .   
  There are limitations on such power which grow out of the essen-
tial nature of all free governments.  Implied reservations of individual 
rights, without which the social compact could not exist, and which 
are respected by all governments entitled to the name.  No court, for 
instance, would hesitate to declare void a statute which enacted that 
A. and B. who were husband and wife to each other should be so no 
longer, but that A. should thereafter be the husband of C., and B. the 
wife of D.  Or which should enact that the homestead now owned by A. 
should no longer be his, but should henceforth be the property of B.79 
Since government was designed to protect these rights 
against arbitrary or wrongful deprivation, any government act 
which violated such rights was not a law, but an act of mere 
force:  
  To lay with one hand the power of the government on the property 
of the citizen, and with the other to bestow it upon favored individuals 
to aid private enterprises and build up private fortunes, is none the 
less a robbery because it is done under the forms of law and is called 
taxation.  This is not legislation.  It is a decree under legislative 
forms.80   
Since the tax was a use of government’s coercive power for the 
benefit of private parties, rather than the general public, it was 
not a law, and thus deprived citizens of their property without 
due process of law. 
C. Cracks in the Foundation: Railroads and The Mill Acts 
The earliest controversies over the public use requirement in 
eminent domain law arose over the two great power sources of 
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries: water power and steam 
power.  In a series of laws passed early in American history, gov-
ernment permitted riparian landowners to dam up streams on 
their property—thus flooding the land of neighboring landown-
ers—to run sawmills or gristmills.  These “Mill Acts” were chal-
lenged as violations of the rule against taking the property of A 
and giving to B,81 and several courts struck down the laws for 
this reason. 
Others upheld the Mill Acts on the theory that the private 
operator of the mill was not actually reaping any monopoly ad-
vantage.  This was because Mill Acts often required the operator 
to serve the public equally, and regulated the rates that the op-
erator could charge.  In Ryerson v. Brown,82 for example, the 
 
 79 Id. at 663. 
 80 Id. at 664. 
 81 See Sandefur, Natural Rights Perspective, supra note 67, at 599–601. 
 82 35 Mich. 333, 338 (1877). 
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Michigan Supreme Court held that it was “essential” to the con-
stitutionality of these Acts “that the statute should require the 
use to be public in fact; in other words, that it should contain 
provisions entitling the public to accommodations.”  Mills were 
thus public utilities, even though operated by private companies, 
and could legitimately exercise the eminent domain power. 
This rule was especially important because it was during 
this period that the whole idea of a private, for-profit corporation 
was being devised.  In previous generations, the term “corpora-
tion” had referred to a quasi-governmental entity: a body of citi-
zens performing some public function with a charter from the 
crown.83  Even economic trade was conducted in this manner, be-
cause in the mercantilist system, the government granted per-
mission and set the terms on which traders could conduct their 
profession.  A “corporation” in the early part of American history 
usually meant a government-backed company with exclusive 
rights to carry on a particular business or function.  For this rea-
son, the generation of the American Founders tended to use the 
terms “corporation” and “monopoly” synonymously.84 
This began to change during the nineteenth century.  To 
terminate the privileged character of corporations, states chose 
not to abolish them, but to equalize the terms on which corporate 
charters were granted.85  Corporations began to lose their special 
status because private entrepreneurs could now easily form pri-
vate, for-profit corporations with no connection to the govern-
ment, except for a charter granted as a ministerial function to 
any applicant meeting the requirements.   
The privatization of the corporation during the nineteenth 
century was a gradual, vitally important development in Ameri-
can law.  It had severe repercussions in the law of eminent do-
main because of railroads.  While tollroads and turnpikes had of-
ten been built by public corporations—and such corporations had 
routinely been permitted to use the eminent domain power—
railroads were less like public corporations and more like wholly 
private business enterprises.  Early cases allowed railroads to 
use eminent domain by simple analogy to turnpike or tollroad 
construction.  But that analogy became weaker as railroads be-
came increasingly private.  In Swan v. Williams,86 the Michigan 
 
 83 See ROBERT HESSEN, IN DEFENSE OF THE CORPORATION ch. 1, ch. 3 (1979). 
 84 See William Letwin, Congress and the Sherman Antitrust Law: 1887–1890, 23 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 221, 226–29 (1956). 
 85 HESSEN, supra note 83, at 29–33.  See also GORDON S. WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF 
THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 321 (1991); PAUL KENS, JUSTICE STEPHEN FIELD: SHAPING 
LIBERTY FROM THE GOLD RUSH TO THE GILDED AGE 50 (1997). 
 86 2 Mich. 427 (1852). 
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Supreme Court tried to solve the confusion by dividing corpora-
tions into three major classes: 
1st. Political or municipal corporations, such as counties, towns, cities 
and villages, which, from their nature, are subject to the unlimited 
control of the Legislature; 2d. Those associations which are created for 
public benefit, and to which the government delegates a portion of its 
sovereign power, to be exercised for public utility, such as turnpike, 
bridge, canal, and railroad companies; and 3d strictly private corpora-
tions, where the private interest of the corporators is the primary ob-
ject of the associations, such as banking, insurance, manufacturing 
and trading companies . . . .  
  The object of strictly private corporations is to aggregate the capi-
tal, the talents, and the skill of individuals, to foster industry and en-
courage the arts.  Private advantage is the ultimate, as well as the 
immediate object of their creation, and such as results to the public is 
incidental, growing out of the general benefits acquired by the appli-
cation of combined capital, skill, and talent to the pursuits of com-
merce and of trade, and the necessities and conveniences of the com-
munity.87 
While public corporations or associations for public benefit 
might exercise the eminent domain power, the Swan court ex-
plained, it could “not for a moment be contended” that “private 
property can be taken by the government from one and bestowed 
upon another for private use.”88  Railroads fell within the second 
category of corporations, and could exercise the eminent domain 
power for the same reasons that the Mill Acts had been sus-
tained: because the law secures to the public the right to use the 
railroad as a common carrier, and because it regulated the rates 
that the railroad could charge.89 
The theory that railroads were public entities because of 
their common carrier status was questionable from the outset.  
Railroad travel was certainly not free, and the owners of railroad 
companies often became immensely wealthy, in part at the ex-
pense of landowners who lost their property.  Still, the theory 
made some sense at a time when business enterprises were 
rarely subject to regulation.90  The theory also made economic 
 
 87 Id. at 434. 
 88 Id. at 435. 
 89 See id. at 437–40. 
 90 In fact, when, in the 1876 case of Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1876), the Su-
preme Court upheld a state’s authority to regulate the prices charged by private busi-
nesses, Justice Stephen Field dissented on the grounds that price regulations were only 
allowed when “some right or privilege is conferred by the government or municipality 
upon the owner, which he can use in connection with his property,” such as the power of 
eminent domain.  Id. at 146 (Field, J., dissenting).  See also Slaughter-House Cases, 83 
U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 88 (1872) (Field, J., dissenting) (noting that when government grants 
private parties “franchises of a public character,” which include delegating “the exercise of 
the sovereign right of eminent domain,” it may “determine . . . the conditions upon which 
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sense.  As Richard Epstein pointed out, condemnations create a 
surplus benefit to the condemnor by transferring property at a 
rate below the market price.91  When the condemnor is allowed to 
appropriate that surplus entirely to himself, principles of equal-
ity are violated, and economic efficiency (secured by stable prop-
erty rights and rewards for productive behavior) is replaced with 
a severe rent-seeking problem.  Regulating the rates charged by 
a utility that employs eminent domain ensures that it will not 
simply appropriate that surplus to itself, but will return it 
equally to the public at large. 
Despite these advantages, the railroad and Mill Act cases set 
a dangerous precedent: privately run corporations, run for pri-
vate profit, could be vested with the power of eminent domain be-
cause they conferred general public advantages on the commu-
nity.  In one of the earliest railroad cases, Bloodgood v. Mohawk 
& Hudson Railroad,92 one judge sounded the warning: “It has 
never been allowed to be a rightful attribute of sovereignty in any 
government professing to be founded upon fixed laws, however 
despotic the form of the government might be, to take the prop-
erty of one individual or subject, and bestow it upon another.”93  
For government to assume such a power was to abandon the 
principles of the founding:  
[N]o approved writer on public law will be found to go as far as [Tho-
mas] Hobbes in vindicating the unqualified right of the sovereign to 
assume at will the property of the subject.  Every other writer is dis-
posed to recognize a distinction between right and power as applied to 
sovereign and subject, and to acknowledge that a rightful government 
must be founded on some other principle than that of mere force.94   
That principle was the equal protection of each person’s right 
to property, but condemnations for for-profit railroad corpora-
tions endangered this principle.  As for the theory that the public 
derived some general advantage from the construction of the 
railroad, this was not enough: “If an incidental benefit, resulting 
 
[the eminent domain power] shall be enjoyed,” including business regulations). 
 91 RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT 
DOMAIN 163–64 (1985).  
If the sum of all wealth in the state of nature is 100 and that in society is 150, 
then there is a potential surplus of 50, which must be distributed. . . .  When 
the state acquires private property for public use, the public use requirement 
should ensure the “fair” allocation of surplus by preventing any group from ap-
propriating more than a pro rata share.  Takings for private use are therefore 
forbidden because the takers get to keep the full surplus, even if just compen-
sation is paid. 
Id.  
 92 18 Wend. 9 (N.Y. 1837). 
 93 Id. at 56. 
 94 Id. at 57. 
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to the public from the mode in which individuals in pursuit of 
their own interest use their property, will constitute a public use 
of it . . . , it will be found very difficult to set limits to the power of 
appropriating private property.”95   
Nevertheless, the common carrier rationale prevailed and 
grew with the passing years.  Eventually, it was even applied to 
electric power lines and telephone wires, and the legal fictions 
required to keep up this rationale became increasingly difficult to 
defend by the early twentieth century.96  It was at this time that 
the massive philosophical shift, known as the Progressive Move-
ment, took the next important step in eroding the public use limi-
tation. 
III. PROGRESSIVISM AND THE REGULATORY WELFARE STATE 
A. The Progressives’ Abandonment of Locke 
Lockean political philosophy, as represented by Loan Ass’n v. 
Topeka, prevailed in the courts during what is today called the 
“Lochner era,” but it came to a gradual end with the rise of Pro-
gressivism, a political movement seeking a broad range of social 
and economic reforms through government regulation.  Although 
Progressivism defies easy definition, its central theme was the 
abandonment of classical liberal concepts of individual rights and 
natural liberty, and their replacement with notions of collective 
decision-making.97 
The Progressives shared four main ideas that would reshape 
the legal profession’s understanding of sovereignty along Black-
stonian and Hobbesian lines, and ultimately expand the reach of 
eminent domain far beyond the Founders’ beliefs.  The first was 
the idea that rights are really just permissions granted by the 
government.  The second was that the Constitution is a “living 
document,” which changes to suit the exigencies of the moment.  
The third, closely allied with the second, was the idea that courts 
should avoid interfering when legislatures enact laws restricting 
individual rights.  The fourth was the idea that government ex-
ists, not to secure individual rights—which, again, had come to 
be seen as permissions created by government—but to shape so-
ciety into the form that the collective found pleasing. 
The Progressive attitude toward individual rights was well 
described by one of its epigones, Justice Louis Brandeis, when he 
wrote, “in the interest of the public and in order to preserve the 
 
 95 Id. at 65. 
 96 See Philip Nichols, Jr., The Meaning of Public Use in the Law of Eminent Domain, 
20 B.U. L. REV. 615, 621–23 (1940). 
 97 See ERIC FONER, THE STORY OF AMERICAN FREEDOM 140 (1998). 
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liberty and the property of the great majority of the citizens of a 
State, rights of property and the liberty of the individual must be 
remoulded, from time to time, to meet the changing needs of soci-
ety.”98  Government’s primary role was now viewed as the shap-
ing of society rather than the protection of human beings; it was 
to provide people with the necessities of comfortable living,99 and 
to employ its coercive powers not merely to protect but to create 
individual personalities.100  Government, no longer seen as a po-
tential threat to freedom, autonomy, and dignity, was seen as the 
creator of these values, and in creating them, the government 
was justified in manipulating individual choice.  For the Progres-
sives, in fact, legal restrictions on liberty, or redistributions of 
property, were not really limits on freedom, but expansions of the 
newly defined concept of freedom.  When it came to property 
rights, this concept of freedom sought to replace the time-honored 
notion of the owner’s right to do what he or she pleased with his 
or her own property, with the owner’s entitlement to participate 
in collective decision-making with regard to all other property in 
the area.  As Eric Claeys puts it, “[e]ach local owner loses sub-
stantial freedom to control the use of his own parcel of land, but 
gains the opportunity to vote on how his neighbors ought to use 
their properties.”101  Thus, Progressive attitudes toward property 
rights included frequent violations of the rights of individuals, 
but because society took precedence over the individual, rights 
would have to yield to the “public good.” 
Where previous generations saw private property as a natu-
ral right which government was obliged to protect, the Progres-
sives believed the right to property was merely a creation of posi-
tive law.  As Louis Menand puts it, the Progressives saw 
freedoms as “socially engineered spaces where parties engaged in 
specified pursuits enjoy protection from parties who would oth-
erwise naturally seek to interfere . . . . [R]ights are created not 
for the good of individuals, but for the good of society.  Individual 
 
 98 Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 376 (1921) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
 99 See John Dewey, The Future of Liberalism, 32 J. PHIL. 225 (1935).  
[F]ull freedom of the human spirit and of individuality can be achieved only as 
there is effective opportunity to share in the cultural resources of civiliza-
tion. . . .  Any liberalism that does not make full cultural freedom supreme and 
that does not see the relation between it and genuine industrial freedom as a 
way of life is a degenerate and delusive liberalism. 
Id. 
 100 Thomas G. West, Progressivism and the Transformation of American Government, 
in THE PROGRESSIVE REVOLUTION IN POLITICS AND POLITICAL SCIENCE: TRANSFORMING 
THE AMERICAN REGIME 13, 16 (John Marini & Ken Masugi eds., 2005). 
 101 Eric R. Claeys, Zoning and Progressive Political Theory, in THE PROGRESSIVE 
REVOLUTION IN POLITICS AND POLITICAL SCIENCE, supra note 100, at 287, 292.   
01-48 SANDEFUR.DOC 12/26/2006 10:46:42 AM 
2006] Mine And Thine Distinct 21 
freedoms are manufactured to achieve group ends.”102  Rather 
than reflecting any natural, moral entitlement, property was 
simply the invention of the state, and the state could alter the 
rules at will.103  The Progressives employed this newfound au-
thority in the pursuit of a slew of social projects.104 
It would be difficult to exaggerate the degree to which Pro-
gressivism was alienated from the basis of American constitu-
tionalism.  The Progressives believed that the Lockean principles 
of the founding had been based on theories of knowledge that had 
now been disproved by, among other things, the science of evolu-
tion.  Lockeanism had held that humans are endowed with a par-
ticular, special nature, a characteristic quality that distinguishes 
man from all the rest of nature.  This unique spark was also the 
source of inalienable, individual rights.  But under the influence 
of philosophers such as Hegel,105 the Progressives “put an end to 
the idea that . . . there exists some order, invisible to us, whose 
logic we transgress at our peril.”106  Hegel’s followers came to ar-
gue that the distinctions between humans and the rest of nature 
were artifices created by History and social consensus.  Moral or-
ders, economic orders, and even, in extreme cases, physical or-
ders,107 were held to be matters of mere convention by thinkers 
who contended that the human will could master what were once 
conceived of as objective truths.  Harnessing this willpower on a 
collective scale was the main purpose of Progressive politics.108 
In fact, such collective will was not only the source of politi-
cal legitimacy, but the very source of individual identity.109  The 
 
 102 LOUIS MENAND, THE METAPHYSICAL CLUB 409 (2001). 
 103 See, e.g., CHARLES EDWARD MERRIAM, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN POLITICAL 
THEORIES 311 (Russell & Russell 1968) (1903) (“The present tendency . . . in American 
political theory is to disregard the once dominant ideas of natural rights and the social 
contract . . . . [R]ights are considered to have their source not in nature, but in law.”). 
 104 See generally MICHAEL MCGERR, A FIERCE DISCONTENT: THE RISE AND FALL OF 
THE PROGRESSIVE MOVEMENT IN AMERICA, 1870–1920 (2003); RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE 
AGE OF REFORM (1955).  See also KEVIN STARR, INVENTING THE DREAM: CALIFORNIA 
THROUGH THE PROGRESSIVE ERA 199–282 (1985). 
 105 See generally Mathias Reimann, Nineteenth Century German Legal Science, 31 
B.C. L. REV. 837 (1990); Stephen A. Siegel, Historism in Late Nineteenth-Century Consti-
tutional Thought, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 1431 (1990). 
 106 MENAND, supra note 102, at 439. 
 107 See generally ZHORES MEDVEDEV, THE RISE AND FALL OF T.D. LYSENKO (1969) (de-
tailing the life of Soviet biologist Lysenko, who contended that biological characteristics 
were matters of convention, rather than nature). 
 108 See JOHN A. MARINI, THE POLITICS OF BUDGET CONTROL 187 (1992). 
 109 See id.  See also Dewey, supra note 99, at 227.  
[Progressive] liberalism knows that an individual is nothing fixed, given ready-
made.  It is something achieved, and achieved not in isolation, but the aid and 
support of conditions, cultural and physical, including in “cultural” economic, 
legal, and political institutions as well as science and art.  Liberalism knows 
that social conditions may restrict, distort, and almost prevent the develop-
ment of individuality.  It therefore takes an active interest in the working of 
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good state did not take the nature of individuals as a given, nor 
did it recognize any rights originating in human nature, let alone 
any pre-political standards of justice.  Those who relied on such 
concepts were, in Oliver Wendell Holmes’ phrase, “churning the 
void in hope of making cheese.”110  Rather, morality, human na-
ture, and individual rights were generated and shaped only by 
the conscious, focused will of the collective society.  This vision 
placed a disturbing emphasis on the power of political leaders, as 
Woodrow Wilson’s description of “leaders of men” makes clear: 
“Men are as clay in the hands of the consummate leader.”111 
The second Progressive idea was the notion of a “living con-
stitution.”112  In this conception, the Constitution’s restrictions on 
government power had to be “redefined” and “remolded” to meet 
the modern need for government regulation.  One contemporary 
admirer of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes described his jurispru-
dence this way: 
Holmes came to the bench in 1882, when the transition from individu-
alism to collectivism in England was in progress. . . . [He] was too 
learned in the history of the law to be blind to the fact that the social-
istic trend in American political thought would finally demand exten-
sive paternal legislation in no uncertain terms; and that when this 
demand became strong enough serious consequences might follow the 
failure of the courts to acquiesce . . . .   
  . . . [T]he necessity for the establishment of a benevolent attitude 
towards social reform was apparent . . . . [yet] the Constitution was 
 
social institutions that have a bearing, positive or negative, upon the growth of 
individuals who shall be rugged in fact and not merely in abstract theory.  It is 
as much interested in positive construction of favorable institutions, legal, po-
litical, and economic, as it is in the work of removing abuses and overt oppres-
sions. 
Id.  
 110 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., Letter to Alice Stopford Greene (Aug. 20, 1909), in 
THE ESSENTIAL HOLMES 115, 116 (Richard A. Posner ed., 1992).  Another interesting indi-
cation of Holmes’ fundamentally Hobbesian understanding of sovereignty comes in his 
comment on sovereign immunity: suing the government, he said, “seems to me like shak-
ing one’s fist at the sky, when the sky furnishes the energy that enables one to raise the 
fist.”  HOLMES, JR., Letter to Harold Laski (Jan. 29, 1926), in THE ESSENTIAL HOLMES, 
supra, at 234, 235.  Cf. Berns, supra note 18, at 407, noting that, for Hobbes,  
[o]pposing the sovereign’s will in any particular case would be opposing the 
ground of all property and, hence, self-defeating.  When citizens are allowed to 
sue the supreme authority, the question cannot be whether the sovereign or his 
ministers had a right to do what was done, but rather what it was that the 
sovereign in fact willed in this matter.  
 111 6 WOODROW WILSON, Leaders of Men (1890), reprinted in The PAPERS OF 
WOODROW WILSON 646, 650 (Arthur S. Link ed., 1969). 
 112 This term first appeared in Arthur W. Machen Jr., The Elasticity of the Constitu-
tion, 14 HARV. L. REV. 200, 205 (1901), but was popularized in HOWARD LEE MCBAIN, THE 
LIVING CONSTITUTION (1927).  See also R. G. Tugwell, That Living Constitution, THE NEW 
REPUBLIC, June 20, 1928, at 120; G. EDWARD WHITE, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE NEW 
DEAL 356 n.25 (2000). 
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regarded as almost immutable. . . . [N]o further [Amendment] might 
be looked for short of a popular upheaval. 
  Next to amendment of the Constitution, the most feasible means 
of giving validity to new principles was to change the interpretation of 
the provisions under which the inevitable social legislation would be 
held invalid.  “Liberty of contract” and the broad powers of review as-
sumed by the courts under the 5th and 14th Amendments were the 
elements which barred the way to reform,—and it is against these in-
terpretations that Justice Holmes’ most significant attacks have been 
directed.113 
It was not that Holmes was a socialist—in fact, he was 
not114—but that Holmes and his allies adopted a view of the judi-
ciary that drastically curtailed its role in limiting legislative 
power.  This was the third Progressive idea—the concept of judi-
cial restraint.  “If my fellow citizens want to go to Hell,” Holmes 
is reputed to have said, “I will help them.  It’s my job.”115  Holmes 
abandoned older principles of natural, inherent limits on legisla-
tive authority, which he saw as mere superstitions.116  He went 
even further in favor of the legislature than Blackstone had.  As 
a true follower of Hobbes,117 Holmes believed that rights do not 
derive from the nature of human beings, but are simply permis-
sions granted by society and revocable at will; the judiciary ex-
ceeds its proper bounds if it intervened at such a moment.  
Holmes’ ultra-democratic principles were so extreme that he 
wrote in his most famous opinion that “the word liberty in the 
Fourteenth Amendment is perverted when it is held to prevent 
the natural outcome of a dominant opinion,”118 even though it is 
difficult to imagine what else the word could possibly mean.  
Most fundamentally, where previous generations had held that a 
political society was based on a general assent to certain common 
principles,119 Holmes argued that the Constitution was not based 
on any principles of political philosophy at all.  Holmes wrote, “a 
constitution is not intended to embody a particular economic the-
 
 113 DORSEY RICHARDSON, CONSTITUTIONAL DOCTRINES OF JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL 
HOLMES 41 (1924), in 42 JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY STUDIES IN HISTORICAL AND PO-
LITICAL SCIENCE 319, 359 (1924). 
 114 See MENAND, supra note 102, at 65. 
 115 Walter Berns, The Supreme Court as Republican Schoolmaster: Constitutional In-
terpretation and the “Genius of the People,” in THE SUPREME COURT AND AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONALISM 3, 11 (Bradford P. Wilson & Ken Masugi eds., 1998) (quoting Letter 
from Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. to Harold Laski (Mar. 4, 1920), in 1 HOLMES–LASKI 
LETTERS, at 194 (Mark de Wolfe Howe ed., 1963)). 
 116 See, e.g., Oliver Wendell Holmes, Natural Law, 32 HARV. L. REV. 40 (1918). 
 117 See, e.g., Ben W. Palmer, Hobbes, Holmes and Hitler, 31 A.B.A. J. 569 (1945). 
 118 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 119 See, e.g., VA. CONST. § 15 (1776) (“[N]o free government, or the blessings of liberty, 
can be preserved to any people, but by a firm adherence to justice, moderation, temper-
ance, frugality, and virtue, and by frequent recurrence to fundamental principles.”). 
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ory . . . . It is made for people of fundamentally differing 
views.”120  This was a departure from the entire history of West-
ern political philosophy, and particularly the Declaration of In-
dependence, which held that political society is only possible 
among people of fundamentally shared views.121 
Perhaps paradoxically, the concept of judicial restraint was 
deeply allied to the idea of a “living constitution.”  Courts could 
take a passive, seemingly non-partisan role in cases involving 
legislative entrenchments on previously protected rights, thus 
pursuing an air of objectivity while in fact advancing Progressive 
ideals, or at least allowing the advancement of Progressive activ-
ism in legislatures.  By abandoning the fundamentally shared 
views of American constitutionalism—which had once helped an-
chor American legislatures to philosophical principles—Holmes 
and his followers allowed the ship of state to drift toward the 
goals to which Progressives were steering, all while professing 
personal detachment from the project. 
One of those who preferred to steer was Louis Brandeis.  In 
1936, in a flattering portrait of Brandeis entitled Brandeis and 
the Modern State, Professor Alpheus Thomas Mason praised the 
justice for having recognized that “[p]roperty has a social func-
tion to perform; it is a means, not an end in itself,” and that when 
property interferes with “that fundamental freedom of life for 
which property is only a means. . . . it should be controlled [by the 
government].”122  Like Blackstone, Brandeis’ focus was primarily 
on mechanisms of social organization, not on the individual lib-
erty that America’s Founders believed such mechanisms ought to 
serve.  Thus the state’s power to regulate the economy “is not 
conditioned upon the existence of economic need but flows from 
the broader right of Americans to preserve and to establish such 
institutions, social and economic, as seem to them desirable.”123  
Notions of government preserving individual liberty were simply 
outdated: Mason praised Brandeis’ “conviction that eighteenth 
century individualistic philosophy of rights and property is no 
longer a creed adequate for modern life,”124 even while he voiced 
some slight concern that Brandeis’ “principles exhibit an element 
of collectivism so strong as somewhat to embarrass those who 
 
 120 Lochner, 198 U.S. at 75–76 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
 121  See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, 1 Stat. 1 (1776) (“[G]overnments are 
instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed . . . as 
to them shall seem most likely to affect their safety and happiness.”). 
 122 ALPHEUS THOMAS MASON, BRANDEIS AND THE MODERN STATE 211–12 (Sherman F. 
Mittell ed., 1936) (1933) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Ernest Poole, 
Brandeis, 71 THE AMERICAN MAGAZINE, Feb. 1911, at 481, 493). 
 123 Id. at 211. 
 124 Id. at 232–33. 
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endorse his libertarian doctrines.”125  Mason noted that Brandeis’ 
“zeal for social justice and his belief in the genuine worth of the 
individual sometimes cause him to favor even drastic regulation 
of those very liberties which many consider it the primary pur-
pose of the Bill of Rights to protect.”126  Holmes, Mason argued, 
professed no opinion as to the desirability of economic redistribu-
tion, but “[i]f Mr. Justice Brandeis sustains social legislation, it is 
because he believes it desirable and expedient as well as consti-
tutional.”127  Whatever their differences, Holmes and Brandeis 
shared a fundamental premise with Hobbes and with Blackstone: 
that there were no pre-political limits on what government might 
do in the “interests of society.” 
Significantly, the use of eminent domain expanded greatly 
during the Progressive era.  Since government was no longer 
seen as a device for protecting equal rights, projects which once 
would have been considered beyond the state’s authority were 
now seen as perfectly legitimate.  The government’s role was not 
to police the boundaries of rights, “restrain[ing] men from injur-
ing one another,” as the Founders had believed;128 it was to take 
an active role in forming a better society in general.  Thus, the 
Progressives adopted a wide variety of government programs for 
manipulating society, including zoning,129 mandatory govern-
ment schooling,130 racial segregation,131 government control over 
the money supply,132 eugenics programs,133 and even the Pledge 
of Allegiance.134  And it was during this period that the term 
“blight” first came to be applied to neighborhoods, to describe ar-
eas that failed to perform economically to standards that the 
government preferred.135  As the reach of sovereignty expanded, 
so, too, did the power of eminent domain.  In Rindge Co. v. 
County of Los Angeles,136 the Supreme Court upheld the condem-
nation of land for public recreation, because “[p]ublic uses are not 
 
 125 Id. at 206. 
 126 Id. at 222. 
 127 Id. at 224. 
 128 THOMAS JEFFERSON, First Inaugural Address, in WRITINGS, supra note 32, at 492, 
494. 
 129 See Claeys, supra note 101, at 292. 
 130 See MCGERR, supra note 104, at 109–11. 
 131 See id. at 182–218. 
 132 See id. at 163–64. 
 133 See id.at 214. 
 134 See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, HOW PROGRESSIVES REWROTE THE CONSTITUTION 108 
(2006). 
 135 See generally Wendell E. Pritchett, The “Public Menace” of Blight: Urban Renewal 
and the Private Uses of Eminent Domain, 21 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 1 (2003); Eric R. 
Claeys, Euclid Lives?  The Uneasy Legacy of Progressivism in Zoning, 73 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 731, 751–53 (2004).  The first use of the term “blight” to describe a dilapidated 
neighborhood was in Pritz v. Messer, 149 N.E. 30, 35 (Ohio 1925). 
 136 262 U.S. 700 (1923). 
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limited, in the modern view, to matters of mere business neces-
sity and ordinary convenience, but may extend to matters of pub-
lic health, recreation and enjoyment.”137  The California Supreme 
Court went even further: “anything calculated to promote the 
education, the recreation, or the pleasure of the public is to be in-
cluded within the legitimate domain of public purposes” permit-
ting the exercise of eminent domain.138 
B. The New Deal Canonizes Progressivism 
The confluence of “the Holmesian negative canon of limited 
court action and the aggressive New Deal version of judicial posi-
tivism” was to finalize the break with the Lockean tradition in a 
series of cases in the 1930s.139  In 1934, writer and Yale Univer-
sity Professor Francis W. Coker concluded that the debate over 
government regulation of property had pretty much been settled 
in favor of extensive government regulation.  “In some decisions, 
indeed, the American courts have enunciated a broad and posi-
tive collectivist doctrine” affirming such regulation.140  The notion 
that preserving individual rights is a goal to be served by gov-
ernment was outmoded: there “is no important economic group 
that now holds in practice to any anti-interventionist conception 
of the proper sphere of state activity in the economic field.”141  
Coker admired the Roosevelt Administration’s “rapid advances in 
collectivism”142 which, “if they work passably well in the emer-
gency [of the Great Depression], they will in many particulars 
became [sic] permanent parts of governmental policy.”143  Such a 
result was perfectly consistent with the trend of Progressive po-
litical philosophy, because 
[a]s the means of production and distribution change, the forms of so-
cial interdependence also change, creating new problems of comfort, 
convenience, decency, and order.  The specific interferences with indi-
vidual economic freedom have recently assumed somewhat new forms, 
and there may appear to have been a general movement from indi-
vidualism to collectivism.  But private property is itself a highly col-
lectivistic institution, dependent for its existence upon very substan-
tial restraints, rigorously applied by the organized force of the 
community, upon individual freedom.  At any given period of time, 
therefore, the law intervenes, not only to protect individual owners in 
what are then regarded as proper uses of private property, but also to 
 
 137 Id. at 707. 
 138 Egan v. City of San Francisco, 133 P. 294, 296 (Cal. 1913). 
 139 ARTHUR A. EKIRCH JR., IDEOLOGIES AND UTOPIAS: THE IMPACT OF THE NEW DEAL 
ON AMERICAN THOUGHT 205 (1969). 
 140 FRANCIS W. COKER, RECENT POLITICAL THOUGHT 554 (1934). 
 141 Id. at 556. 
 142 Id. at 558. 
 143 Id. at 559. 
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safeguard individuals and the community as a whole against oppres-
sive and incompetent uses of property.144 
Two years later, James Madison’s biographer and Progres-
sive ideologue, Irving Brant, published a shrill, partisan book 
called Storm Over the Constitution, denouncing the “nine men in 
black robes” who stood in the way of nationwide economic reor-
ganization.145  “In the combat between economic democracy and 
the industrial oligarchy,” he wrote,  
the Supreme Court has at all times been the last and most formidable 
entrenchment of privileged wealth. . . .  The fundamental necessity is 
to find power through which federal and state governments, but par-
ticularly the federal government, may cope with the economic and so-
cial problems of the twentieth century.  Federal power must be found 
in the Constitution; the state governments need only relief from mis-
applied constitutional restraints.146   
Brant argued that the Constitution must be interpreted to allow 
Congress to experiment with new forms of “economic democracy.”  
“Commerce among the states must be saved from demoraliza-
tion,” he wrote.147  “Let that be the touchstone of constitutional 
interpretation and it will allow the federal government to go ex-
actly so far, in controlling activities affecting interstate com-
merce, as may be necessary to make the commercial life of the 
nation serve the general welfare.”148 
In 1934, the Supreme Court formally adopted the Progres-
sive doctrine that laws restricting economic liberty and private 
property rights would be presumed constitutional except in ex-
tremely rare circumstances.149  “The court has repeatedly sus-
tained curtailment of enjoyment of private property, in the public 
interest,” wrote Justice Roberts in Nebbia v. New York.150  “The 
owner’s rights may be subordinated to the needs of other private 
owners whose pursuits are vital to the paramount interests of the 
community.”151  Although not an eminent domain case, Nebbia is 
a legal landmark because it finally made the Progressive princi-
ple of deference toward legislative control over economic freedom 
and property rights into constitutional law, which it remains to-
 
 144 Id.  
 145 IRVING BRANT, STORM OVER THE CONSTITUTION 234–48 (1936). 
 146 Id. at 242. 
 147 Id. at 145. 
 148 Id.  Brant suggested three options: amending the Constitution, restricting the 
power of judicial review, or “[c]onversion of the liberal Supreme Court minority into a 
consistent majority.”  Id. at 242.  To this third option he added a less than ingenuous 
footnote: “But not by enlarging the Court even though Lincoln did it.”  Id. at 242 n.*.  In 
1937, of course, Franklin Roosevelt would propose just such a court-packing scheme. 
 149 See WHITE, supra note 112, at ch. 8 (2000). 
 150 291 U.S. 502, 525 (1934). 
 151 Id. 
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day.  The Court declared that states are “free to adopt whatever 
economic policy may reasonably be deemed to promote public 
welfare, and to enforce that policy by legislation adapted to its 
purpose.  The courts are without authority either to declare such 
policy, or, when it is declared by the legislature, to override it.”152 
Four justices dissented in Nebbia, and in the next three 
years, the Court sometimes patrolled the constitutional limits by 
striking down some of the more extreme New Deal programs.153  
But after the 1937 Supreme Court term, such dissent became 
more subdued and infrequent.  In its place was erected a dogma 
that political philosophy is simply no concern of judges,154 and 
that every conceivable (and even absurd) presumption is to be 
indulged in favor of the validity of the legislature’s actions.155  
While the Court sometimes recited formulas suggesting it had 
some degree of understanding of the role of government—such as 
“rationally related to a legitimate government interest”—it had 
abandoned the tools that allowed it to understand what that role 
is.  By 1987, over two hundred years after the founding of the 
United States, the Supreme Court would confess the humiliating 
fact that “[o]ur cases have not elaborated on the standards for de-
termining what constitutes a ‘legitimate state interest.’”156 The 
Court had simply forgotten what government exists to do.157  
When faced with that question, it would usually substitute “tra-
dition” for constitutional principles,158 or employ some other 
technique to avoid addressing whether government may right-
fully pursue the goal in question.  As a consequence, the Court 
tended—with notable exceptions159—to sustain any government 
 
 152 Id. at 537. 
 153 See, e.g., A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); 
United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936). 
 154 See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION 
OF THE LAW 6 (1990). 
 155 See, e.g., FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 315–16 (1993) (stating that 
under the rational basis test, “those attacking the rationality of the legislative classifica-
tion have the burden to negative every conceivable basis which might support it. . . . [W]e 
never require a legislature to articulate its reasons for enacting a statute, [so] it is en-
tirely irrelevant for constitutional purposes whether the conceived reason for the chal-
lenged [law] actually motivated the legislature. . . . [T]he absence of legislative facts ex-
plaining the [law] . . . has no significance . . . . [and] legislative judgment [is] virtually 
unreviewable . . . .”) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 156 Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 834 (1987). 
 157 Cf. 6 JAMES MADISON, Letter to Henry Lee (Jan. 1, 1792), in THE WRITINGS OF 
JAMES MADISON 80, 81 n.1 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1906) (“If not only the means [of govern-
ment’s actions], but the objects are unlimited, the parchment had better be thrown into 
the fire at once . . . .”). 
 158 See, e.g., Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 775 (2003) (“Only fundamental rights 
and liberties which are ‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition’ and ‘implicit 
in the concept of ordered liberty’ qualify for [due process] protection.”) (quoting Washing-
ton v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997)). 
 159 See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003) (holding that a Texas statute, 
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interest as “legitimate” when it achieved significant public sup-
port.160  And as a consequence, the Court had given its blessing, 
as a practical matter, to the abandonment of Lockean limits on 
government sovereignty.  At the end of the 1930s, the Blacksto-
nian vision—that the legislature could do whatever was not 
naturally impossible—was almost entirely realized in American 
jurisprudence.  The “[r]evival of absolutism,” said Roscoe Pound 
in 1940, “is a manifest fact. . . . The books of the day are full of 
theories which when carried out lead to organization of society in 
an omnicompetent state in which the individual man is sub-
merged.”161 
There was one class of cases, however, where the Court con-
tinued to exercise some degree of judicial review.  In United 
States v. Carolene Products Co.,162 the Court indicated that its 
“presumption of constitutionality” would not apply “when legisla-
tion appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the 
Constitution.”  In other words, the Blackstonian notion of an in-
herently sovereign government, free to act however it pleased ex-
cept where specifically forbidden, was enshrined for good, and as 
time went on, it would become increasingly clear that even some 
of the “specific prohibitions” in the Constitution would receive 
less judicial solicitude. 
IV. “PUBLIC USE” SINCE THE NEW DEAL 
A. The Court Abandons “Public Use” 
The 1930s’ abandonment of judicial protection for economic 
freedom was applied in the law of eminent domain only a decade 
later, when the Court held in United States ex rel. Tennessee Val-
ley Authority v. Welch that “it is the function of Congress to de-
cide what type of taking is for a public use . . . . Any departure 
from this judicial restraint would result in courts deciding on 
what is and is not a governmental function . . . which has proved 
impracticable in other fields.”163  Welch, like the cases that were 
to follow, reflected the Progressives' innovations in constitutional 
law in that it was argued under the Public Use Clause rather 
than the Due Process Clause.  Earlier cases had established that 
 
criminalizing private sexual conduct between two people of the same sex, violated the 
Constitution). 
 160 See EPSTEIN, supra note 91, at 109 (“The legitimate state interest in vogue today 
is a bare conclusion, tantamount to asserting that the action is legitimate because it is 
lawful. . . . [It] functions, at best, as a convenient label for serious inquiry, without defin-
ing the set of permissible ends of government action.”). 
 161 ROSCOE POUND, CONTEMPORARY JURISTIC THEORY 1 (Fred B. Rothman Publica-
tions 1999) (1940). 
 162 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). 
 163 327 U.S. 546, 551–52 (1946). 
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the prohibition on taking from A and giving to B was located in 
the substantive protections of the Due Process Clause—because 
enactments which redistributed wealth on the basis of political 
popularity were not laws, but were mere enactments.164  But with 
the New Deal abandonment of this principle, reflected in the 
Welch Court’s reference to “judicial restraint . . . in other fields,” 
such cases were litigated under the Public Use Clause instead.165 
The results, however, were no more successful than they 
would have been had they been brought under the older theory.  
Having explicitly abandoned the role of “deciding on what is and 
is not a governmental function,” the Court finally rejected the no-
tion that government may not take property from A and give it to 
B.  Berman v. Parker166 involved a challenge to a Washington, 
D.C., slum-clearance program.  Judging certain neighborhoods 
dangerous to the public welfare, Congress declared that cleaning 
up the city could not be accomplished “by the ordinary operations 
of private enterprise alone,”167 and ordered the condemnation of 
“blighted areas” of the city.168  Moreover, Congress declared that 
“the leasing or sale” of the property taken in this way “for rede-
velopment pursuant to a project area redevelopment plan . . . is 
hereby declared to be a public use.”169 
Along with the substandard property, officials condemned 
viable property, including a department store owned by Max 
Morris.  Morris sued, arguing that the condemnation violated the 
 
 164 See, e.g., Loan Ass’n v. Topeka, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 655, 664 (1874) (“This is not leg-
islation.  It is a decree under legislative forms.”). 
 165 This is the answer to the seeming paradox that the Fifth Amendment refers ex-
plicitly only to compensating owners for takings that are “for public use”—which might be 
interpreting as allowing takings for private use to go uncompensated.  This absurd result 
comes from forgetting the prohibition on private takings located in the Due Process 
Clause.  The proper reading of the Fifth Amendment therefore declares that no person 
shall be deprived of property without due process of law (including that no person shall be 
deprived of property simply to transfer it to more politically successful parties), and that 
when property is taken for public use, it shall be compensated.  Justice Kennedy is there-
fore correct in his observation that  
the Takings Clause . . . has not been understood to be a substantive or abso-
lute limit on the government’s power to act.  The Clause operates as a condi-
tional limitation, permitting the government to do what it wants so long as it 
pays the charge.  The Clause presupposes what the government intends to do 
is otherwise constitutional.   
Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 545 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring in judg-
ment).  To get to the compensation requirement, the government must first satisfy the 
Due Process limitation forbidding private takings. 
 166 348 U.S. 26 (1954). 
 167 Id. at 29 (quoting District of Columbia Redevelopment Act of 1945, Pub. L. No. 79-
592, 60 Stat. 790, § 2 (1946)). 
 168 The Court itself noted that “[t]he Act does not define either ‘slums’ or ‘blighted 
areas.’”  Id. at 28 n.*. 
 169 Id. at 29 (quoting District of Columbia Redevelopment Act of 1945, Pub. L. No. 79-
592, 60 Stat. 790, § 2 (1946)). 
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Public Use Clause because it would simply hand his property 
over to a private developer to build a store or some other building 
for his own private profit.  Justice William O. Douglas rejected 
this argument in no uncertain terms: 
Subject to specific constitutional limitations, when the legislature has 
spoken, the public interest has been declared in terms well-nigh con-
clusive.  In such cases the legislature, not the judiciary, is the main 
guardian of the public needs to be served by social legislation . . . . 
This principle admits of no exception merely because the power of 
eminent domain is involved.  The role of the judiciary in determining 
whether that power is being exercised for a public purpose is an ex-
tremely narrow one.170 
Douglas—a Roosevelt appointee firmly in the grip of Pro-
gressive constitutionalism171—was applying Nebbia-style defer-
ence to the legislature’s authority to reshape the neighborhood.  
In the process, he and the rest of the Court affirmed that gov-
ernment could take property from one private party and give it to 
another if the overriding goal were important enough—and the 
Court would defer to the legislature’s judgment as to whether the 
goal was important enough.172  What is particularly noteworthy 
about Berman is its lack of caution; the decision—which was 
unanimous—explicitly conceded that government may transfer 
property directly from one owner to another: “The public end may 
be as well or better served through an agency of private enter-
prise than through a department of government . . . . We cannot 
say that public ownership is the sole method of promoting the 
public purposes of community redevelopment projects.”173  Ber-
man does not appear ever to have been criticized by a lower 
court. 
The Court did not revisit the Public Use Clause for another 
thirty years.  But during that time, protections for property 
rights continued to erode.  In Penn Central Transportation Co. v. 
New York City,174 the Court upheld the validity of a New York 
law forbidding the owners of a historic train station from con-
structing an office tower on the site.  Although the law did not 
actually seize the title to the land, it prohibited the purchasers 
 
 170 Id. at 32. 
 171 See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955) (“The 
day is gone when this Court uses the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
to strike down state laws, regulatory of business and industrial conditions, because they 
may be unwise, improvident, or out of harmony with a particular school of thought.”). 
 172 See Berman, 348 U.S. at 33 (“Appellants argue that . . . the project [is] a taking 
from one businessman for the benefit of another businessman.  But the means of execut-
ing the project are for Congress and Congress alone to determine, once the public purpose 
has been established.”). 
 173 Id. at 33–34. 
 174 Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 135–38 (1978). 
01-48 SANDEFUR.DOC 12/26/2006 10:46:42 AM 
32 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 10:1 
from using their land as they wanted, and thus deprived them of 
the value of their property.  Although the Court had long held 
that government should not be able to evade the duty of paying 
just compensation through the trick of simply prohibiting the use 
of land while allowing the owner to keep the title,175 it rejected 
the property owners’ argument that the law was a taking of their 
property.  To decide when legal interference with property use 
amounts to a taking of the property, Penn Central proposed a 
confusing, multi-factor “balancing” test, under which a property 
owner is almost never entitled to compensation.176  Explaining 
this vague approach, Justice Brennan wrote that a taking “may 
more readily be found when the interference with property can be 
characterized as a physical invasion by government, than when 
interference arises from some public program adjusting the bene-
fits and burdens of economic life to promote the common good.”177   
Under the principles of the American founding, of course, 
such programs are simply not constitutional, but the Court 
hardly paused to address that issue, concluding that “in a wide 
variety of contexts . . . government may execute laws or programs 
that adversely affect recognized economic values.”178  Brennan 
simply asserted, without explanation, that government has a le-
gitimate interest in redistributing wealth, even when these “ad-
versely affect” the property rights of those who have earned this 
wealth.  The Penn Central test he devised purported to distin-
guish such valid programs from laws that unjustly deprived per-
sons of their property, but he provided no substantive standards 
for making that distinction.  Instead, he substituted such wholly 
subjective standards as “fairness” and interference with reason-
able investment-backed expectations179 (the reasonableness to be 
determined by the judge’s subjective standards).  The result has 
been an inconsistent body of law under which the property owner 
almost invariably loses.180  The Court would employ a similar 
 
 175 See, e.g., Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166, 177–78 (1871) (“It 
would be a very curious and unsatisfactory result . . . [to hold] that if the government re-
frains from the absolute conversion of real property to the uses of the public it can destroy 
its value entirely . . . without making any compensation, because, in the narrowest sense 
of that word, it is not taken for the public use.”). 
 176 See John E. Fee, Unearthing the Denominator in Regulatory Taking Claims, 61 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1535, 1536 n.4 (1994) (explaining the balancing test created in Penn Central 
Transportation Co., 438 U.S. at 124); David F. Coursen, The Takings Jurisprudence of the 
Court of Federal Claims and the Federal Circuit, 29 ENVTL. L. 821, 823 n.12 (1999) (not-
ing that the Court has never compensated a property owner under the Penn Central test). 
 177 Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 124 (citation omitted). 
 178 Id. 
 179 Id.  The term “reasonable” was actually added to the Penn Central formula in Kai-
ser Aetna v. United States.  444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979). 
 180 See William P. Barr et al., The Gild That Is Killing the Lily: How Confusion over 
Regulatory Takings Doctrine is Undermining the Core Protections of the Takings Clause, 
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technique in the Kelo decision. 
Finally, in the 1984 case of Hawaii Housing v. Midkiff,181 the 
Court returned to the subject of eminent domain when it upheld 
a Hawaii law allowing any person renting a home to request that 
the state condemn the house, and resell it to the renter at a sub-
stantially discounted rate.  This scheme, which even more obvi-
ously took property from A and gave it to B than did the law in 
Berman, was devised to address the problem of “land oligopoly,” 
according to the state.182  Forty-seven percent of the state’s land 
was held by seventy-two private landowners, the state argued, 
and this caused a shortage of land for residences.183  As a matter 
of economics, this is a bit silly: seventy-two distinct competitors in 
a marketplace, owning collectively less than half the land, is 
hardly an oligopoly, if that term even has meaning.184  The state’s 
further contention that this “oligopoly” was responsible for the 
shortage of residential land is belied by its admission that federal 
and state government owned forty-nine percent of the land.185  
The government had purchased almost half of the land in the 
state, and then, worried that there were too few landowners left, 
its solution was to redistribute what little property remained in 
private hands. 
In any event, the Court held that the law satisfied the Public 
 
73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 429, 484 (2005).  
Inconsistency was inevitable [under Penn Central].  Regulations that cause 
massive economic harm to the owner are held not to go too far, whereas others 
with only a slight impact are found to constitute regulatory takings.  As a re-
sult, the regulatory takings cases have fallen back to a three-factor, ad hoc test 
that tries to get at the idea of fairness to the owner. . . . It is inherently vague 
and subjective.  As it turns out, the Court has usually not considered it unfair 
or unjust to force owners to bear fairly heavy burdens, at least if the owner is 
rich.  
Id. (citations omitted). 
 181 467 U.S. 229, 233–36 (1984). 
 182 Id. at 242.  As the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals noted when it struck down the 
Hawaii law as a violation of the Public Use Clause, “[t]he key in Berman is the intermedi-
ate step in which the property was transferred from the private owner to the government 
for a public purpose, i.e., the redevelopment of the area.  In the case before us there is no 
such intermediate step . . . . The lessee simply retains possession of residential property 
throughout the condemnation process until he receives fee simple title. . . . Nothing in 
Berman permits the lessee of property to take ownership of that property from the owner 
involuntarily through condemnation proceedings.”  Midkiff v. Tom, 702 F.2d 788, 797 (9th 
Cir. 1983), rev’d 467 U.S. 229 (1984). 
 183 Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 232. 
 184 See Arthur Austin, Antitrust Reaction to the Merger Wave: The Revolution vs. The 
Counterrevolution, 66 N.C. L. REV. 931, 938–39 (1988), and GEORGE REISMAN, CAPITALISM: 
A TREATISE ON ECONOMICS 390–91 (1996), both noting that oligopoly is indefinable.  See 
also Norman R. Prance, Price Data Dissemination as a Per Se Violation of the Sherman 
Act, 45 U. PITT. L. REV. 55, 56 (1983) (contending that oligopoly should be defined as a 
market with “no more than approximately six firms of equal size”). 
 185 Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 232. 
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Use Clause despite transferring property exclusively to private 
users.  Since “public use” and “public purpose” were synonymous, 
and since the legislature was responsible for declaring when a 
purpose was “public,” the legislature possessed unlimited author-
ity to redistribute private property for whatever reason it consid-
ered important enough.  Emphasizing that “deference to the leg-
islature’s ‘public use’ determination is required ‘until it is shown 
to involve an impossibility,’”186 Justice Sandra Day O’Connor 
gave lip service to the principle that government may not engage 
in purely private transfers, but concluded that “where the exer-
cise of the eminent domain power is rationally related to a con-
ceivable public purpose, the Court has never held a compensated 
taking to be proscribed by the Public Use Clause.”187  As with 
Berman, Midkiff was unanimous. 
In the meantime, the Michigan Supreme Court had issued 
its infamous decision in Poletown Neighborhood Council v. De-
troit,188 allowing Detroit to condemn an entire neighborhood and 
transfer the property to the General Motors Corporation to build 
an auto factory.189  Astute observers realized that liberalizing the 
rules on eminent domain had put in place the ingredients for a 
ruthless competition between private interest groups, seeking to 
persuade Michigan authorities to condemn property for their own 
benefit. 
B. How Deference Tore Down the “Good Fences” 
Whenever government has power to redistribute benefits 
and burdens between constituents, interest groups will compete 
for control of that power in order to secure benefits for them-
selves or to impose burdens on their competitors.  Modern 
economists refer to this contest as “rent seeking,” and predict 
that when government begins to transfer property between pri-
vate parties, those parties will start spending their time and en-
ergy trying to persuade the government to give them someone 
else’s property.190 
 
 186 Id. at 240 (quoting Old Dominion Co. v. United States, 269 U.S. 55, 66 (1925)). 
 187 Id. at 241. 
 188 304 N.W.2d 455 (Mich. 1981). 
 189 See Timothy Sandefur, A Gleeful Obituary for Poletown Neighborhood Council v. 
Detroit, 28 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 651 (2005). 
 190 See generally JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF 
CONSENT 287 (Ann Arbor Paperbacks 1965) (1962).  
[T]he profitability of investment in [political organization] is a direct function 
of the size of the total public sector and an inverse function of the “generality” 
of the government budget. . . . The organized pressure group thus arises be-
cause differential advantages are expected to be secured through the political 
process. 
Id.  
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The consequences of judicial abandonment of the public use 
requirement bear this prediction.  Nationwide, during the years 
from 1998 to 2002, there were some 3700 reported instances of 
eminent domain used against private property owners for pro-
jects involving private beneficiaries.191  Another 6000 property 
owners were threatened with condemnation.  Some of the exam-
ples of eminent domain abuse are truly astonishing.  The City of 
Merriam, Kansas, condemned a lot being used by one car dealer-
ship to sell the land to the BMW dealership next door.192  The 
state of Mississippi condemned a twenty-three acre neighborhood 
to give to the Nissan company for an auto factory, even though 
the head of the state’s Development Authority admitted to the 
New York Times that Nissan did not need the land.193  Las Vegas, 
Nevada, condemned a mini-mall owned by the Pappas family to 
build a parking lot for the Fremont Street Experience, a pedes-
trian mall in the downtown area.  While in many cases, topless 
bars and other “adult” establishments are considered examples of 
“blight” that must be cleaned up by the use of eminent domain, 
the Pappas family lost their property so that tourists could visit 
such attractions as the Topless Girls of Glitter Gulch!194  In one 
especially notorious case, billionaire Donald Trump convinced the 
government of Atlantic City, New Jersey, to condemn the home of 
an elderly widow so that he could build a limousine parking 
lot.195  When Atlanta, Georgia, was constructing an Olympic Vil-
lage for the 1996 games, it condemned the homes and businesses 
of thousands of people—and even condemned three homeless 
shelters.196  (When China did the same thing to attract the 
 
 191 See DANA BERLINER, PUBLIC POWER, PRIVATE GAIN 2 (2003). 
 192 Linda Cruse, Merriam Sells Condemned Property to Baron BMW, KANSAS CITY 
STAR (Mo.), Jan. 27, 1999, Shawnee & Lenexa, at 4. 
 193 See Sandefur, Natural Rights Perspective, supra note 67, at 598. 
 194 See City of Las Vegas Downtown Redevelopment Agency v. Pappas, 76 P.3d 1, 5–9 
(Nev. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 1603 (2003); Richard Abowitz, Gulch Doesn’t Glitter 
and It’s Not Gold, LAS VEGAS WEEKLY, May 16, 2002, http://www.lasvegasweekly.com/ 
2002/05_16/nightlife_skin.html; see also Brief Amici Curiae of Mary Bugryn Dudko et al. 
In Support of Petitioners at 18–22, Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005) 
(No. 04-108), available at http://www.cfif.org/htdocs/legal_issues/legal_activities/ 
amicus_briefs/Kelo_Formatted_USSC_Draft.pdf. 
 195 Casino Reinvestment Dev. Auth. v. Banin, 727 A.2d 102 (N.J. 1998).  Though he 
won the government over, the Superior Court of New Jersey ruled in favor of the widow, 
but only because there was no guarantee that Trump would only use the land as a park-
ing lot.  See also Stephen J. Jones, Note, Trumping Eminent Domain Law: An Argument 
for Strict Scrutiny Analysis under the Public Use Requirement of the Fifth Amendment, 50 
SYRACUSE L. REV. 285, 288 (2000). 
 196 See Loretta Ross, Atlanta Olympics: A Steamroller Flattening the Poor And the 
Homeless, NEWS & RECORD (Greensboro, N.C.), July 19, 1996, at A8; Douglas Holt, Com-
mon Ground: Crowds, Advertisers Mob Atlanta’s Olympic Park, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, 
July 22, 1996 at 1A (“Some say [the Olympic park] has taken away a refuge for homeless 
people . . . . Robin Monsky, an Atlanta Committee for the Olympic Games spokeswoman, 
denied that the park displaced any homeless shelters.”). 
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Olympics to Beijing, it was widely condemned by international 
human rights groups.197) 
Erasing the public use limitation meant that pressure 
groups raced to local governments, seeking to have property con-
demned for their benefit—and why not?  The developers would 
get rich; the tax revenue to the city would increase; the brand 
new “old town” would look so nice; the politicians would look like 
visionaries.  The only losers would be the property owners who 
lacked the political influence to persuade the government to re-
spect their property rights. 
By lowering the barriers that protected property from the po-
litical contest, the courts had revived the Hobbesian state of na-
ture, where there is “no propriety, no dominion, no mine and 
thine distinct; but only that to be every man’s, that he can get: 
and for so long, as he can keep it.”198  And the results were disas-
trous, both from an economic and social perspective. 
From an economic perspective, rent-seeking is economically 
inefficient because it encourages groups to invest their resources 
and energy into nonproductive activity such as lobbying, rather 
than into wealth-creating activity or innovation.199  By distract-
ing producers from meeting consumer needs, and drawing re-
sources away from the productive sectors of the economy and into 
the wining-and-dining of legislators, rent-seeking results in a 
lower supply of goods and services and higher costs to the con-
sumer.  Also, rent-seeking has a ratchet effect.  Since the benefits 
conferred by government will be localized and concentrated, 
while the costs are broadly dispersed, the incentives will be 
skewed toward increased lobbying and ever-increasing amounts 
of wealth redistribution.200  Rent-seeking behavior therefore 
tends to “restrict[ ] those political processes which can ordinarily 
be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation,”201 
which was, at one time, considered a special concern of the judi-
cial branch.  Finally, rent-seeking behavior rewards those who 
are already most wealthy and powerful.  A group’s wealth can 
 
 197 See Press Release, Amnesty International, China: Human Rights—A Long Way to 
Go Before the Olympics (Aug. 5, 2005), available at http://news.amnesty.org/index/ 
ENGASA170232005/$FILE/newsrelease.pdf; Human Rights Watch, Beijing 2008 Human 
Rights and the Olympics in China: Forced Evictions, http://hrw.org/campaigns/china/ 
beijing08/evictions.htm (last visited Nov. 2, 2006).  See also Frank Langfitt, China Razes 
Alleys, Bulldozes Way of Life, BALTIMORE SUN, Aug. 18, 2002, at 1A; Michael A. Lev, Bei-
jing’s Poor Pay Price for Urban Renewal, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, January 13, 2002 at 4. 
 198 HOBBES, supra note 12, at 101. 
 199 See BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note 190, at 111 (“[B]argaining opportunities 
afforded in the political process cause the individual to invest more resources in decision-
making, and, in this way, cause the attainment of ‘solution' to be much more costly.”). 
 200 See id. at 287–88 (noting the “spiral effect” of ever-greater lobbying efforts). 
 201 United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4. 
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greatly affect its ability to influence legislation.202  Small grass-
roots organizations, or individuals, are less able to rally support 
behind a cause, and in the eminent domain context, winners are 
so enriched that they are increasingly likely to win the next time 
around.  This problem is acute in eminent domain abuse.203 
But more generally, the rash of eminent domain abuse has 
led to a severe weakening of social institutions.204  Robert Frost 
famously said “Good fences make good neighbors,”205 meaning 
that respect for each other’s privacy and individuality reinforces 
the sense of goodwill that makes for a healthy community.  As 
Friedrich Hayek put it, 
  The understanding that “good fences make good neighbours,” that 
is, that men can use their own knowledge in the pursuit of their own 
ends without colliding with each other only if clear boundaries can be 
drawn between their respective domains of free action, is the basis on 
which all known civilization has grown.  Property . . . is the only solu-
tion men have yet discovered to the problem of reconciling individual 
freedom with an absence of conflict. . . . There can be no law in the 
sense of universal rules of conduct which does not determine bounda-
ries of the domains of freedom by laying down rules that enable each 
to ascertain where he is free to act.206 
American culture has long cherished the spirit of neighborli-
ness and mutual respect that depends entirely on “good fences”: 
that is, on mutual respect for property rights and, thereby, the 
individual liberties of one’s fellow citizens.207  But eminent do-
 
 202 See McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 115–16 (2003). 
 203 See Donald J. Kochan, “Public Use” and the Independent Judiciary: Condemnation 
in an Interest-Group Perspective, 3 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 49, 82 (1998)  
Even though a particular condemnation may concentrate the cost of the taking 
on the affected landowner . . . that owner is not likely to invest enough to suc-
cessfully oppose the condemnation.  First, the existence of compensation, even 
when not truly substituting for market or subjective value, decreases the cost 
to the affected owner of the land seized and thereby decreases his incentive to 
invest in fighting the condemnation.  Furthermore, the special interest is likely 
to have more political influence, because unlike the landowner, the interest 
group is probably a repeat player in the political process . . . . 
Id.  
 204 This section is based in part on the amicus curiae brief I filed on behalf of the 
Bugryn and Dudko families and Mr. Curtis Blanc, in Kelo v. City of New London.  See 
Brief Amici Curiae of Mary Bugryn Dudko, et al. In Support of Petitioners, supra note 
194. 
 205 ROBERT FROST, Mending Wall, reprinted in ROBERT FROST: COLLECTED POEMS, 
PROSE, & PLAYS 39, 39 (Richard Poirier & Mark Richardson eds., Library of America 
1995) (1916). 
 206 1 F.A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY: RULES AND ORDER 107 (1973).  See 
also RICHARD PIPES, PROPERTY AND FREEDOM 119 (1999) (“It is the sense of economic in-
dependence and that of personal worth which it generates that give rise to the idea of 
freedom.”). 
 207 See, e.g., Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Adams (Oct. 28, 1813), in THE 
ADAMS–JEFFERSON LETTERS 387, 391 (Lester Cappon ed., 1959).  
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main abuse threatens this sense of domestic tranquility by put-
ting the private property rights of some citizens at the mercy of 
others. 
The Poletown case provides a stark example of this.208  The 
public debate over the project, which ultimately resulted in the 
condemnation and demolition of an entire neighborhood, turned 
what had been a peaceful, integrated community into a battle-
ground between neighbors and officials.  As Jeanie Wylie de-
scribes in her book about the case: 
[P]eople whose lives were composed of their union loyalty, their tenure 
in the auto plants, their patriotism, and their willingness to fight in 
U.S. wars were rejected, ignored, and robbed by the very institutions 
through which they claimed their identities. . . . [T]hese same people 
broke free of the illusion of civility that these institutions carry as 
trappings. . . . [H]istorically law-abiding Poletown residents felt free to 
cry out and to disrupt [a General Motors stockholders] meeting. In ex-
actly the same spirit, Poletown resisters learned to interrupt report-
ers’ interviews, to raise placards at the mayor’s inaugural dinner, and, 
ultimately to go to jail when the city’s police force moved on the 
[town’s] church.209 
The residents of Poletown, like so many other victims of 
eminent domain abuse, came to see democratic government not 
as a system of mutual respect and participation toward a com-
mon good, but as a machine destroying their homes, their family 
heritage, and their community.   
Alexis de Tocqueville argued that American democracy 
rested on democratic mores, and in particular on the spirit of re-
straint by which “no one in the United States has dared to pro-
fess the maxim that everything is allowed in the interests of soci-
ety, an impious maxim apparently invented in an age of freedom 
in order to legitimize every future tyrant.”210  He believed that 
this spirit of restraint—that is, of mutual respect for each other’s 
 
Every one, by his property, or by his satisfactory situation, is interested in the 
support of law and order.  And such men may safely and advantageously re-
serve to themselves a wholesome controul over their public affairs, and a de-
gree of freedom, which in the hands of the [mob-rule] of the cities of Europe, 
would be instantly perverted to the demolition and destruction of every thing 
public and private. 
Id.   
 208 Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455 (Mich. 1981). 
 209 JEANIE WYLIE, POLETOWN: COMMUNITY BETRAYED 219–20 (1989).  Wylie’s book 
remains the standard history of the Poletown case, although it is in some ways (not rele-
vant here) misleading.  See generally William A. Fischel, The Political Economy of Public 
Use in Poletown: How Federal Grants Encourage Excessive Use of Eminent Domain, 2004 
MICH. ST. L. REV. 929 (2004) (discussing the use of eminent domain in Poletwon and fed-
eral grants’ impact). 
 210 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 292 (J. P. Mayer ed., George 
Lawrence trans., Anchor Books 1969) (1840). 
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rights—was responsible for the fact that “while the law allows 
the American people to do everything,” there are things which 
their mores “forbid[] them to dare.”211  Eliminating the limits on 
eminent domain upends these mores, and puts the livelihood and 
the safety of a citizen’s home at the mercy of the political process.  
It has established the principle that “everything is allowed in the 
interests of society,” and turned the ballot box into a weapon. 
This disillusionment is deeply harmful to a democratic soci-
ety.  As Professor Eric Claeys writes, the American Founders saw 
property not only as a vital protection for individual liberty, and 
an essential part of a prosperous economy, but also as a neces-
sary foundation of healthy social participation.212 
[T]he Founders appreciated that self-government, the moral virtues, 
and social happiness cannot flourish unless . . . . [t]he law and politi-
cal opinion . . . teach and habituate citizens to see their fellow citizens 
not as rivals but as neighbors and potential friends. That spirit of con-
cord and friendship cannot flourish without security and trust. Secu-
rity and trust, however, cannot flourish unless people first feel secure 
that they can take care of their most basic needs of survival and, more 
generally, that none of their would-be friends will interfere with their 
own. . . . [A]s [James] Wilson emphasizes, without the establishment 
of private property, “the tranquility of society would be perpetually 
disturbed by fierce and ungovernable competitions for the possession 
and enjoyment of things, insufficient to satisfy all, and by no rules of 
adjustment distributed to each.” Trite as it may sound, good fences 
make good neighbors.213 
By lowering those fences, the Progressive movement—
despite its frequent invocation of the value of democracy—ended 
up corroding those principles on which a stable and worthy de-
mocratic society must rest. 
C. The Courts Reexamine Eminent Domain 
In July 2004, the Michigan Supreme Court, urged on by a 
coalition of conservative and liberal public policy groups, over-
ruled its twenty-year-old Poletown decision.214  Allowing private 
property to be taken and transferred to private parties was a 
mistake, the court unanimously declared.  “After all, if one’s 
ownership of private property is forever subject to the govern-
ment’s determination that another private party would put one’s 
 
 211 Id.  
 212 See Eric R. Claeys, Property, Morality, and Society in Founding Era Legal Trea-
tises 14–26 (Aug. 30, 2002) (unpublished manuscript, presented at the American Political 
Science Association Annual Meeting, on file with author). 
 213 Id. at 32 (quoting 2 JAMES WILSON, On Property, in WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 711, 
719 (Robert McCloskey ed., 1967)). 
 214 County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765, 787 (Mich. 2004).   
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land to better use, then the ownership of real property is per-
petually threatened by the expansion plans of any large discount 
retailer, ‘megastore,’ or the like.”215 
The court recognized that the basic flaw in Poletown lay in 
its holding that “public use” and “public benefit” were synony-
mous terms.  Since every business contributes to the public bene-
fit, by creating jobs or in some other way, that holding meant 
that the power of eminent domain was effectively limitless.  Al-
though the court recognized that the railroad and Mill Act cases 
provided some precedent for allowing private parties to use the 
eminent domain power, those cases did not permit the wide-
spread exploitation of eminent domain by wholly private entities 
for their own aggrandizement.216 
The demise of Poletown came only days after Susette Kelo 
had asked the United States Supreme Court to review the con-
demnation of her home in New London, Connecticut.  When the 
Court agreed to hear the case, many defenders of property rights 
were hopeful that the Court would put some meaningful limit on 
the use of eminent domain at the federal level. 
Kelo purchased a fixer-upper home on the Thames River in 
New London, Connecticut, in 1997.  Divorced at the time, she be-
gan renovating the home.  She and her partner (and later hus-
band) Tim lived happily in the home until October of 2002, when 
Tim was in a car accident that left him severely handicapped.  
Susette, a nurse, took care of him, and took on extra jobs.217  
Meanwhile, in 1998, Pfizer pharmaceuticals decided to construct 
a multimillion dollar research facility nearby—a significant boost 
to the local economy.  New London city officials hoped that the 
facility could serve as an anchor for further economic develop-
ment.  In 2000, the city asked the New London Development 
Corporation—a private company—to draw up the Fort Trumbull 
Municipal Development Plan, covering a ninety-acre economic 
redevelopment area.  The Plan was divided into seven parcels, 
some of which would include a hotel and conference center, office 
space, fancy new housing, and a Coast Guard museum.  The Plan 
was extremely vague on what would be done with several sub-
parcels, however.218 
Among the affected property owners were Wilhelmina Dery 
 
 215 Id. at 786. 
 216 Id. at 782. 
 217 The Kelo Decision: Investigating Takings of Homes and Other Private Property: 
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 7 (2005) [hereinafter Hear-
ings] (statement of Susette Kelo). 
 218 Brief of Petitioners at 4, Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S.Ct. 2655 (2005)  (No. 
04-108).   
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and Susette Kelo.  Wilhelmina Dery’s family immigrated from It-
aly in the 1880s, and purchased a home in New London in 1901.  
Two years later they bought the house next door.  Wilhelmina 
was born in the house in 1918, and she grew up there.  During 
World War II, she met a young merchant marine, Charles, at a 
USO dance.  When Charles returned from the war in the Pacific, 
they were married, and he moved into the house.  They opened a 
grocery store and had four children.  When their youngest son, 
Matthew, married, Wilhelmina’s mother gave him the house next 
door as a wedding present.  He took over the family business in 
1976, and with his wife Sue and their son, enjoyed the tightly-
knit Italian neighborhood.  “Nobody locked their doors,” he re-
called.  “You just walked in and yelled.  You’d get fed wherever 
you went.”219 
Susette Kelo had similarly pleasant memories of moving to 
Fort Trumbull.   
I searched all over for a home and finally found this perfect little Vic-
torian cottage with beautiful views of the water.  I was working then 
as a paramedic and was overjoyed that I was able to find a beautiful 
little place I could afford on my salary.  I spent [e]very spare moment 
fixing it up and creating the kind of home I had always dreamed 
of . . . .220   
In the years that followed, she met Tim, a stone mason and 
fellow antique lover, and graduated from nursing school.  Tim did 
the stone work on the house himself, and Susette braided rugs 
and planted a garden.  In 2000, the day before Thanksgiving, the 
Kelos were notified that the city was going to take their home to 
construct a convention center as part of a massive plan for eco-
nomic redevelopment.  The Derys, too, and several other property 
owners received similar notices.  Interestingly, the Italian Dra-
matic Club, a social organization located next door to one of the 
condemned houses, was also originally slated for demolition, but 
was told in 2000 that it could remain in the area.  It may have 
had something to do with the fact that the Italian Dramatic Club 
is frequented by many prominent Connecticut politicians, includ-
ing former Governor John Rowland.221 
The Kelos and the six other families sued, arguing that the 
condemnation of their property violated the “public use” re-
quirement of both the Connecticut and United States Constitu-
 
 219 Barry Yeoman, Whose House Is It Anyway?, AARP MAGAZINE, May & June 2005, 
at 66, 66; see also TIMOTHY SANDEFUR, CORNERSTONE OF LIBERTY: PROPERTY RIGHTS IN 
21ST-CENTURY AMERICA 98 (2006). 
 220 Hearings, supra note 217, at 6 (statement of Susette Kelo).   
 221 Kathleen Edgecomb, Decision to Save Italian Club Questioned, THE DAY (New 
London), Sept. 21, 2000, at A1; SANDEFUR, supra note 219, at 98–99. 
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tions.  After they lost in trial court, the Connecticut Supreme 
Court took up the case directly, and in a four to three decision, 
upheld the condemnation of the property.  The majority indig-
nantly rejected the notion that the Public Use Clause requires 
anything more than a general benefit to the public.  The Con-
necticut Constitution “requires only that the ‘benefit’ of the tak-
ing be available to the general public,” the court held, and “the 
dramatic economic benefit that the development plan is expected 
to have for the public in the New London community, namely, 
the massive projected growths in employment and tax and other 
revenues” was enough to sustain the condemnation.222  Moreover, 
the court endorsed the most extreme form of deference;223 it even 
found the Poletown decision was too protective of property own-
ers, and “decline[d] to follow” it on the grounds that “the applica-
tion of a ‘heightened scrutiny’ standard” to condemnations bene-
fiting private parties “is inconsistent with our well established 
approach of deference to legislative determinations of public 
use.”224  It concluded:  
[E]conomic development plans that the appropriate legislative author-
ity rationally has determined will promote municipal economic devel-
opment by creating new jobs, increasing tax and other revenues, and 
otherwise revitalizing distressed urban areas, constitute a valid public 
use for the exercise of the eminent domain power under either the 
state or federal constitution [sic].225 
In a five to four decision, the United States Supreme Court 
affirmed the decision and refused to reconsider its deferential at-
titude toward eminent domain.  Just as Justice Brennan had as-
serted in Penn Central that redistributing wealth was a legiti-
mate state interest—while providing no support for that 
proposition—Justice Stevens asserted without support that 
“[p]romoting economic development is a traditional and long ac-
cepted function of government.”226  And, following Berman, the 
Court reasoned that anything that benefits the public (as deter-
mined by the legislature) satisfies the Public Use Clause.227  The 
decision confirms the virtually boundless power of state bureau-
crats to redistribute private property for whatever reason they 
determine to be in the public interest. 
The justifications Stevens provided for such boundless legis-
 
 222 Kelo v. City of New London, 843 A.2d 500, 552 (Conn. 2004). 
 223 See id. at 527–28 (“Both federal and state courts place an overwhelming emphasis 
on the legislative purpose and motive behind the taking, and give substantial deference to 
the legislative determination of purpose.”). 
 224 Id. at 528–29 n.39. 
 225 Id. at 531. 
 226 Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2665 (2005). 
 227 Id. at 2662–63. 
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lative authority were tenuous.  For instance, although he pointed 
to the Mill Act and railroad cases as proof that it would be “diffi-
cult to administer” any strict limit on the eminent domain 
power,228 those cases prove nothing of the sort.  They generally 
required that any private entity exercising the power of eminent 
domain must be regulated by the state to ensure that they do not 
aggrandize to themselves the monopoly profits they gain through 
exploiting government power: such entities were limited in what 
they could charge, and were required to serve all customers with-
out discrimination.  Under such regulations, as Justice Thomas 
pointed out, the mills and railroads “were ‘public uses’ in the 
fullest sense of the word, because the public could legally use and 
benefit from them equally.”229  The judiciary did not find this a 
judicially unmanageable requirement.  What’s more, some state 
courts struck down the Mill Acts for violating the public use re-
quirement.230  When, a year before Kelo, the Michigan Supreme 
Court overruled its Poletown decision, it did not find it “difficult 
to administer” a more meaningful standard of public use. 
More important to the outcome of Kelo was Stevens’ asser-
tion that a lax benefit-to-the-public standard serves “the diverse 
and always evolving needs of society.”231  This approach to consti-
tutional interpretation is generally called “living constitutional-
ism,”232 but Kelo reveals that this approach is more appropriately 
called “dead constitutionalism.”  Seeing the Constitution as mal-
leable, depending on the circumstances and needs of the moment, 
results not in a living Constitution, but in a Constitution with all 
sorts of dead spots in it.  The violence that the Progressives and 
their progeny have done to the Constitution comes at a price, af-
ter all.  For example, by allowing the Commerce Clause to mu-
tate into a federal police power giving Congress authority over 
anything it sees fit to regulate,233 the Court has transformed the 
federal government into a government of unenumerated and 
practically limitless powers.234  This requires ignoring several ex-
plicit passages in the Constitution, such as the statement that 
 
 228 Id. at 2662. 
 229 Id. at 2681–83 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 230 See id. at 2682 n.2 (listing state cases striking down the Mill Acts).  See also 
Sandefur, Natural Rights Perspective, supra note 67 at 599–601 (discussing cases that 
struck down the Mill Acts). 
 231 Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2662. 
 232 See, e.g, WHITE, supra note 112, at 299 (defining “living constitutionalism” as the 
theory that the Constitution is “an adaptive document that responds to changing social 
and economic conditions through altered judicial interpretations of its central textual pro-
visions”). 
 233 See Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2205–06 (2005). 
 234 Cf. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552 (1995) (“We start with first princi-
ples.  The Constitution creates a Federal Government of enumerated powers.”). 
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Congress has only those “legislative Powers herein granted.”235  
Note the plural of “powers,” and the phrase “herein granted.”  
Today’s Court simply ignores these words to make way for the 
regulatory welfare state.  Likewise, to avoid striking down vari-
ous government programs that are “traditional and long ac-
cepted,” the Court simply rendered the phrase “public use” mean-
ingless.  The Progressive Constitution is a Constitution whose 
clauses are manipulated, bent, stretched, or ignored outright so 
as to allow the welfare state to accomplish its aims.  To call this 
“living constitutionalism” is perverse, because it is neither living, 
nor constitutionalism. 
Compounding the perversity is the fact that the so-called 
“liberal” members of the Supreme Court—Justices Stevens, 
Souter, Ginsberg, and Breyer—all joined in a decision which 
opens the door to massive “corporate welfare” programs at the 
expense of the poor and members of minority groups.  This might 
seem paradoxical at first, but the key is that property rights are 
more important for the poor and powerless than for the rich and 
influential.  Wealthy corporations, after all, have the resources to 
persuade political bodies to do their will, and this is why one 
rarely (if ever) sees the homes of wealthy and influential people 
being bulldozed to build shopping centers.  But people like 
Susette Kelo and Wilhelmina Dery can only rely on the Constitu-
tion, and the federal courts, to protect their rights.  As James Ely 
has concluded, Kelo “puts the lie to [the] canard” that “judicial so-
licitude for economic rights [is] favoritism to the wealthy and 
business interests.”236 
In the end, the Kelo decision was really not surprising.  Ste-
vens was certainly right that “[f]or more than a century, our pub-
lic use jurisprudence has . . . afford[ed] legislatures broad lati-
tude in determining what public needs justify the use of the 
takings power.”237  The Progressive Era decisions which created 
that “latitude” were based on a rejection of the founding princi-
ples of private property and limited government, and Stevens 
was simply following their direction. 
V. REASON FOR HOPE AFTER KELO? 
It is not that remarkable that the Kelo decision would follow 
Berman.  What is remarkable is that four Justices dissented, in 
two strong opinions.  These dissents represent the first time in 
 
 235 U.S. CONST. art I, § 1. 
 236 James W. Ely Jr., “Poor Relation” Once More: The Supreme Court and the Vanish-
ing Rights of Property Owners, 2004–2005 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 39, 64 (2005). 
 237 Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2664 (2005). 
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over a century that any Justice of the Supreme Court has ever 
held that the Public Use Clause puts any serious limitations on 
the power of eminent domain.  Moreover, these dissenters appear 
to be the first federal judges ever to openly criticize Berman. 
Justice O’Connor—the author of Midkiff—dissented on the 
ground that the majority’s rule rendered the phrase “public use” 
meaningless, contradicting a basic rule of interpretation.238  Since 
the Due Process Clause requires the government to act in the 
public’s welfare, the majority decision “makes the Public Use 
Clause redundant with the Due Process Clause, which already 
prohibits irrational government action.”239  Moreover, equating 
public use with public benefit would also reduce the Clause to 
“little more than hortatory fluff,”240 since the legislature will al-
ways declare that its decisions benefit the public. 
O’Connor identified three types of condemnations that satis-
fied the Public Use Clause: (1) takings for government buildings 
or other actual public uses, (2) transfers to common carriers and 
public utilities that might be run by private parties, and, most 
problematically, (3) takings which “serve a public pur-
pose . . . even if the property is destined for subsequent private 
use.”241  O’Connor cited Berman and Midkiff as examples of the 
third type, because in those cases, “the extraordinary, precon-
demnation use of the targeted property inflicted affirmative 
harm on society . . . .”242  Eliminating that harm required taking 
the property.  Since the taking itself, as distinguished from the 
subsequent use of the property, accomplished the legislature’s 
goals, the Public Use Clause was satisfied, and “it did not matter 
that the property was turned over to private use.”243 
Justice O’Connor’s attempt to reconcile Berman and her 
Midkiff opinion with her dissent in Kelo is deeply unsatisfying, 
and does not survive Justice Stevens’ criticism.  As Stevens 
pointed out, there was nothing affirmatively “harmful” about the 
property at issue in Berman, which was a non-blighted depart-
ment store.244  Nor has the law of eminent domain ever limited 
condemnations to instances of “harmful property use.”245  On the 
contrary, harmful property use has always been the subject of 
nuisance law, and, in the traditional understanding of govern-
ment’s powers, subject to the police power, not the power of emi-
 
 238  Id. at 2673 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 239 Id. at 2676. 
 240 Id. at 2673. 
 241 Id. 
 242 Id. at 2674. 
 243 Id. 
 244 Id. at 2666 n.16 (majority opinion). 
 245 Id. 
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nent domain.246  But then O’Connor reaches the essential prob-
lem with Kelo and its ancestry: 
The trouble with economic development takings is that private benefit 
and incidental public benefit are, by definition, merged and mutually 
reinforcing.  In this case, for example, any boon for Pfizer or the plan’s 
developer is difficult to disaggregate from the promised public gains in 
taxes and jobs. . . .  
 . . . .  
 . . .  [W]ho among us can say she already makes the most produc-
tive or attractive possible use of her property?  The specter of condem-
nation hangs over all property.  Nothing is to prevent the State from 
replacing any Motel 6 with a Ritz-Carlton, any home with a shopping 
mall, or any farm with a factory.247 
Strong as Justice O’Connor’s dissent was, it was only Justice 
Thomas who saw into the philosophical heart of the Kelo case.  
Midkiff and Berman were both wrongly decided to begin with, he 
stated, part of “a string of . . . cases construing the Public Use 
Clause to be a virtual nullity, without the slightest nod to its 
original meaning.”248  Employing a scrupulous textual analysis, 
Justice Thomas pointed out that “the phrase ‘public use’ con-
trasts with the very different phrase ‘general Welfare’ used else-
where in the Constitution. . . . The Framers would have used 
some such broader term if they had meant the Public Use Clause 
to have a similarly sweeping scope.”249  Referring to sources from 
Blackstone to Kent to Samuel Johnson, Thomas concluded that 
the Public Use Clause “embodied the Framers’ understanding 
that property is a natural, fundamental right, prohibiting the 
government from ‘tak[ing] property from A. and giv[ing] it to 
B.’”250 
As for deference, Thomas was uniquely sensitive to the sus-
picious nature of this argument.  In 1994, Thomas joined with 
Justice Scalia in rejecting the “picking and choosing among vari-
ous rights to be accorded ‘substantive due process’ protection.”251  
 
 246 Alas, another philosophical conundrum arising from the Supreme Court’s Fifth 
Amendment cases is to confuse the police power (the government’s power to defend the 
health, safety, and welfare of the people) with the power of eminent domain (used to pro-
vide public goods).  This error began in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 
413 (1922), and was reiterated in Justice O’Connor’s Midkiff decision, 467 U.S. 229, 240 
(1984) (“The ‘public use’ requirement is thus coterminous with the scope of a sovereign’s 
police powers.”).  Under the police power as properly understood, government may eradi-
cate “harmful property use”—i.e., nuisances—without paying any compensation at all.  In 
Kelo, Justice O’Connor admitted this error and characterized one of the most important 
lines in Midkiff as dictum!  Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2675 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 247 Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2675–76 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 248 Id. at 2678 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 249 Id. at 2679–80 (citation omitted). 
 250 Id. (quoting Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 388 (1798)). 
 251 United States v. Carlton, 512 U.S. 26, 41 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring in judg-
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The “categorical and inexplicable exclusion of so-called ‘economic 
rights’” from such protection despite the Fifth Amendment’s ex-
plicit reference to property “unquestionably involves policymak-
ing rather than neutral legal analysis.”252  Likewise, in Kelo, 
Thomas compared the deference that the majority applied to the 
condemnation of property with the lack of deference in other ar-
eas of the law: 
[I]t is most implausible that the Framers intended to defer to legisla-
tures as to what satisfies the Public Use Clause, uniquely among all 
the express provisions of the Bill of Rights.  We would not defer to a 
legislature’s determination of the various circumstances that estab-
lish, for example, when a search of a home would be reasonable, or 
when a convicted double-murderer may be shackled during a sentenc-
ing proceeding without on-the-record findings, or when state law cre-
ates a property interest protected by the Due Process Clause.   
  Still worse, it is backwards to adopt a searching standard of con-
stitutional review for nontraditional property interests, such as wel-
fare benefits, while deferring to the legislature’s determination as to 
what constitutes a public use when it exercises the power of eminent 
domain, and thereby invades individuals’ traditional rights in real 
property.253 
Finally, like O’Connor, Thomas recognized that the rent-
seeking problem will cause the Kelo decision to lay a dispropor-
tionate burden on the poor and those with less political power.  
“[E]xtending the concept of public purpose to encompass any eco-
nomically beneficial goal guarantees that these losses will fall 
disproportionately on poor communities.  Those communities are 
not only systematically less likely to put their lands to the high-
est and best social use, but are also the least politically power-
ful.”254 
The dissents give reason for hope.  They present solid and 
persuasive arguments, which will influence future legal thinkers.  
More importantly, they reveal a willingness to reconsider some of 
the most pernicious aspects of the last seventy years of Supreme 
Court jurisprudence.  Berman and Midkiff were unanimous and 
their holdings crystal clear.  The same cannot be said of even of 
such atrocities as Dred Scott, Korematsu, Plessy, or Nebbia.  Yet 
it is hard to imagine, fifty years after the holdings in any of those 
cases, four justices writing such powerful dissents challenging 
their basic holdings.  In fact, there are very few instances of Jus-
tices so directly challenging the philosophical trend of the Court’s 
 
ment). 
 252 Id. at 41–42. 
 253 Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2684–85 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
 254 Id. at 2686–87. 
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decisions. 
Kelo stands at one end of a long debate between two funda-
mentally differing views of the American Constitution.  One, 
which I have called the Lockean view, sees government as a tool 
for protecting the rights of individuals against the wrongs of oth-
ers, and sees the overriding goal of constitutionalism as prevent-
ing government from being perverted into a tool for violating 
those rights.  The other view, following Blackstone and Hobbes, 
sees the government as primary and individuals as secondary, 
and believes that rights are created by the society for certain pru-
dential reasons, and when society’s “diverse and always evolving 
needs” require that the citizen relinquish those rights, the courts 
should not stand in the way.  American legal history has been 
profoundly shaped by these two different outlooks, from Chase 
and Iredell’s dispute in Calder to the decisions in Kelo, each of 
which quotes the corresponding Calder opinion that supports it. 
It is hoped that the legal community will take the dissents in 
Kelo seriously.  As Justice Thomas so aptly puts it, “[s]omething 
has gone seriously awry with this Court’s interpretation of the 
Constitution.”255  Setting it right will require a careful considera-
tion of fundamental principles.  Those principles were severely 
damaged by a philosophical movement that abandoned notions of 
individual liberty and private property.  The consequences of that 
movement, in eminent domain as well as other areas of the law, 
have been disastrous.  But so much of our world has been built 
on those errors that fixing the problem will require courage, 
strength, and a great deal of patience. 
CONCLUSION 
Kelo v. New London hardly came out of the blue.  It was a 
logical next step, given the gradual erosion of the Founders’ vi-
sion as enunciated in the Declaration of Independence and the 
Constitution.  Those who were shocked by the outcome of that 
decision, and by the abuse of eminent domain across the nation, 
must understand the philosophical background of the fight they 
are waging.  Only by challenging the assumptions of the modern 
Progressive state can they hope to prevail, and to restore respect 
for the fundamental right of private property. 
 
 255 Id. at 2685. 
